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Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and 
the Structure of Corporate 
Fiduciary Law 
William W.  Bratton* 
Introduction 
The American Law Insti tute (ALI) chose an awkward time to for­
mulate the code of corporate fiduciary duties in Part V of its Princi­
ples of Corporate Governance (Principles). 1 Confidence in fiduciary law 
diminished while this body of rules and standards went through a 
long process of drafting and approval . Its drafters had the difficult 
assignment of formulating "principles" for fiduciary law's  future de­
velopment-rather than merely "restating" past rulings-at a time 
when no consensus existed in the legal community as to why corpo­
rate law imposes fiduciary duties or what the operative "principles" 
of corporate fiduciary law ought to be.2 
This open conceptual background left the drafters considerable 
room to choose the code's  contents , even as it complicated the job 
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. 
1 .  AMERICAN LAw lNsT., PRINCIPLES or CoRPORATE GovERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft 1 992) [hereinafter Proposed Final Draft] . 
This Article focuses on the basic outline of fiduciary rules set out in Part V. It does not 
take up the specialized applications of fiduciary rules in the Pnnciples' sections on merg­
ers and takeovers. 
2. While the Principles went through a series of tentative drafts during the 1 980s, 
academics and policymakers moved away from the view that corporations should be sub­
ject to more s tringent fiduciary regulation and considered instead the deregulatory im­
plications of a microeconomic vision of the corporation. Later, as the Pnnciples moved 
toward final form, the academics turned away from that deregulatory microeconomic 
s tory to consider new modes of corporate self-regulation in microeconomic terms. See 
znfra Part I I .A. 
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of articulating a set of best "principles . "  If the drafters ' decision­
making process were set out for inspection, we would learn much 
about the "principles" that inform today's corporate law. But, un­
fortunately, the drafters do not describe their work in terms of 
choices between and among competing principles. Their extensive 
commentaries are in a bald, doctrinal style that invests results with 
the appearance of inevitability by obscuring the presence of political 
and economic contingencies. 
This Article takes the liberty of explicating some of the choices 
implicit in the structure of the ALI's fiduciary code. I t  identifies two 
potentially conflicting objectives . The drafters chose, on the one 
hand, to confirm the legitimacy of corporate fiduciary law ' s  tradi­
tional fairness norm. On the other hand, they also chose to man­
date a role for business people in the norm's future articulation. 
These objectives have a mutually resistant aspect. The drafters , rec­
ognizing this, did not attempt to meld them together into a directive 
blueprint. Instead, they gathered them into a framework that en­
courages the mediation of corporate disputes even as it puts them 
on a track for legal decision . In addition, they kept the legal de­
scription of the corporation that informs the framework flexible and 
open to situational modification.3 
The Principles, then, give us corporate fiduciary law on an open­
ended foundation. The drafters begin with a traditional fiduciary 
norm. They then attempt to avoid problems intrinsic to its imposi­
tion in business situations by making normative judgments context­
specific, bringing regulated actors into the judgment process, and 
delaying the participation of outside regulators . The question is 
whether this strategy privileges self-regulation at the expense of the 
traditional fiduciary norm, or strengthens the norm by assuring rela­
tional sensitivity in its application . Will the code, by virtue of its 
flexibility and capaciousness,  help restore confidence in fiduciary 
principles ? Or will it encourage their marginalization by inviting a 
new round of substantive dilution ? 
The drafters recommend no solution to this problem of self-regu­
lation and normative choice.4 This Article, taking another liberty, 
does make a recommendation. It suggests that traditional fiduciary 
norms still play a vital role in corporate governance, and that the 
code should be read as an emphatic restatement of those norms. 
3 .  Academic theory i s  virtually the  only thing the drafters exclude from the  model. 
Both antimanagerialist notions of fiduciary regulation and the microeconomic model of 
the corporation are largely absent. 
4. The outcome depends on how legal decisionmakers go about applying the code, 
assuming they apply it at all. Although nothing requires them to follow it ,  it probably 
will be influential. It is already an authoritative source of fiduciary doctrine, and thus 
will exert influence comparable to a leading reference tool. Given the imprecise nature 
of fiduciary doctrine, i t  is therefore well-positioned to influence behavior. 
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The code's expansion of business peoples' decisionmaking role 
need not, and indeed should not, imply the subordination of the 
law's substantive principles . 
Part I of the Article summarizes the code and its drafters ' com­
mentaries .  Part I I  describes volatile theoretical discussions that 
went on in the background while the drafters did their work. It sup-
plements the drafters' commentaries by describing their implicit · 
choices, and defends their flexible, mediative approach. But the de- 1 
fense leaves open a question-whether the code's flexibility implies 1 dilution of the fairness standard . Part III addresses this question j 
and provides a partial answer. I t  asserts , first, that traditional fiduci-
ary concepts retain vitality in corporate contexts and, second, that 
this code should be applied and interpreted to maintain their 
integrity. 
I. The Principles ' Duty of Fair Dealing 
The Principles impose fiduciary duties on corporate directors, of­
ficers, and controlling shareholders5 in a code of sixteen sections.6 
This code synthesizes a large body of cases and statutes covering the 
traditional range of self-dealing transactions including contracts be­
tween directors and officers and the corporation, 7 compensation ar­
rangements ,8 corporate opportunities,9 and competition with the 
corporation. 1 0 
The code begins by changing the name of this body of law. I t  
drops the old appellation "duty of loyalty" and substitutes "duty of 
fair dealing, " drawn from contract law . 1 1  The drafters offer a tech­
nical explanation for this change: In the class of cases where the 
corporate entity is not the beneficiary of the duty, i t  is not clear to 
whom the fiduciary owes the "loyalty" specified in the old title; 
changing the title dispels the ambiguity . 1 2  This explanation, how­
ever, does not satisfy fully. The possibility that the titular change 
has substantive implications needs to be addressed. 
The code's duty, though newly titled, has deep histori cal roots . A 
traditional fairness concept provides its normative center of gravity . 
But the drafters, though they draw on history, express a desire to 
break with it .  They do not want the traditional fairness concept to 
be applied in a traditional conceptual manner. Fiduciary law, they 
5. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 5 . 0  1 .  
6 .  !d. §§ 5 . 0 1 -5.16. 
7. !d. § 5.02.  
8.  !d. § 5.0 3 .  
9.  !d. § 5.04. 
10. !d. § 5 . 06. 
11. Cf U .C.C. § 2 - 1 03(l)(b) ( 1 989) (defining "good faith," the contract law concept 
most closely resembling the duty of loyalty, as "honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade").  
12 . Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, Part V introductory note a, at 264. 
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tell us , is not a set of rules that, properly applied, yields precise an­
swers. 1 3 Under these "principles" of corporate governance, then, 
fairness will not acquire meaning as a matter of deduction from a set 
of first principles embedded in legal doctrine; its substantive mean­
ing instead will emerge in particular decisionmaking contexts . 
The question is whether the change in title also heralds a break 
with history. Its reference to the fairness standard of contract law 
implies a shift away from an externally imposed standard of selfless­
ness to a legal environment more tolerant of self-interested wheel­
ing and dealing. As the discussion that follows shows , some parts of 
the code confirm the suggestion of substantive relaxation, while 
other parts do not. 
A. Process-The Legal Effect of Disinterested-Director Approval 
Fiduciary law's traditional fairness standard imposes a norm of 
selfless conduct on corporate actors . The Principles' code adopts 
that standard, but then retards the norm's imposition by res tricting 
the scope of judicial review. This restriction is another break with 
history. Under the present law of most states, the norm may be im­
posed freely. Access to judicial review is open; absent shareholder 
ratification, management self-dealing transactions are subject to di­
rect judicial scrutiny for fairness . 14 The code partially closes this 
door to judicial review by introducing a sliding scale of s tandards of 
review keyed to a corporation's internal decision making processes . 
The code subjects a transaction between a corporation and a direc­
tor or officer to full fairness scrutiny with the burden of proof on the 
defending officer or director only in cases where the transaction has 
not been approved by disinterested directors or disinterested share­
holders . 1 5  When disinterested-director or shareholder approval fol­
lows full disclosure, the burden of proof shifts to the challenging 
plaintiff and the standard of review is restricted.16 With disinter­
ested-director approval, later judicial review does not go to the 
terms of the transaction directly. Instead, the judge reviews the 
transaction from the viewpoint of the disinterested director who ap­
proved it. 1 7  If the "director reasonably could have concluded that 
13.  According to the drafters, old phrases like "intrinsic fairness "  and "entire fair­
ness" suggest "an often unattainable degree of precision in analysis." ld. 
§ 5 .02(a) (2) (A) cmt., at 289-92. I impute this purpose to the drafters in the light of the 
title change. 
1 4 .  See id. § 5.02 reporter's note 1 ,  at 312-15 (describing the state statutes) . 
1 5 . !d. § 5 .02(a)(l)-(2). 
16 . ld. § 5.02(b ) .  
I 7 .  Unless the action of the approving directors violates the duty of care, the plain­
tiff will have a damages action only against the interested director. A violative transac­
tion also can be rescinded. Id. § 5 .02(a)(2)(B) cmt., illus. 9, at 295-96. 
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the transaction was fair to the corporation" at the time of authoriza­
tion, no breach of duty has occurred. 1 8 Ratification by disinterested 
shareholders has the same effect as under prior law and further con­
tracts the standard of review to a search for waste of  assets . 1 9  
This three-tiered system can b e  explained i n  neutral , technical 
terms. It rationalizes a longstanding anomaly in the s tructure of 
s tate law. Most s tates have safe-harbor statutes for self-dealing 
transactions . 20 Read literally, these statutes shield self-interested 
transactions from subsequent challenge for breach of the duty of 
loyalty if the proponent obtains disinterested-director or share­
holder approval upon full disclosure. Under this literal reading, the 
statutes transform fiduciary law into a self-regulatory system: The 
regulated entity imposes the norm, and the state enforcement appa­
ratus reviews not the substantive judgment but the circumstances 
surrounding its imposition. Courts , however, have not read the 
statutes literally. They have consistently construed them to permit 
direct judicial review for fairness despite disinterested-director ap­
proval. 2 1  This restrictive reading leads to a technical question that 
the case law has never answered: If the statutes do not mean what 
they seem to say, what then do they mean? The cases leave a bundle 
of factors circulating indistinctly-disinterested-director approval, 
shareholder approval, fairness scrutiny, waste scrutiny, business­
judgment scrutiny, and different placements and standards of the 
burden of proof. 22 The Principles' code ties these factors into a 
working whole . 
But the code makes more than just a technical adj ustment. By 
according qualified recognition to disinterested-director approval, 
the code makes a crucial nod in the direction of corporate self-regu­
lation . Disinterested-director approval is the corporate response to 
self-dealing transactions most likely to be employed in the ordinary 
course of business. Unlike shareholder approval, it is obtainable at 
relatively low cost and with limited publicity.23 To accord this pro­
cess anything approaching preclusive legal effect, however, threat­
ens the integrity of the norm of selfless conduct. Disinterested 
1 8 .  !d. § 5 .02 (a) (2) (B) . 
1 9 .  !d. § 5 .02 (a) (2) (D) .  
20 .  !d. § 5 .02 reporter's note I ,  at 3 1 2- 1 5 .  
2 1 .  See, e.g. , Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp . ,  386 F .  Supp. 44 ( D . N.J . 1 974) ;  Aronoff v. 
Albanese, 446 N.Y .S .2d 368 ( 1 982) ;  Flieger v.  Lawrence, 36 1 A.2d 2 1 8  (Del.  1 976) ;  
Remillard Brick Co. v .  Remillard-Dandini Co. ,  24 1 P .2d 66 (Cal. Ct .  App.  1 952) .  
22 .  Some cases have suggested that the  existence of internal corporate approval 
processes at least should shift the burden of proof of fairness to the plaintiff. See Pro­
posed Final Draft, supra note I, § 5 .02 reporter's note I, at 3 1 2- 1 5 . I t  also has been 
suggested that those processes should change the standard of review to waste, at least 
when shareholder ratification has occurred . !d. reporter's note 7, a t  3 2 1 -22 .  But no 
generally accepted legal effect has emerged for disinterested-director ratification. See id. 
§ 5.02 reporter's note 1 -9 ,  at 3 1 2-23;  see also Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R .  Pinto, Statutory 
Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards�. 53 No­
TRE DAME L. REV . 20 1 ,  203-04 ( 1 977 ) .  
23 .  For reporting companies under the Securities Exchange Ac t  of 1 934,  1 5  U.S.C. 
§ 78-78kk ( 1 988 & Supp. I I I  1 99 1 )  (as amended) , shareholder ratification requires com­
pliance with the federal proxy rules. See SEC Solicitation of Proxies Rule, 1 7  C.F .R .  
§ 240 . 1 4a-2 ( 1 992) .  
1088 [VOL. 61 : 1084 
l 
l 
1 
I 
I 
I ' ' 
Bratton 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
directors , as colleagues of the interested directors , often approach 
self-dealing transactions in a spirit of accommodation. 
The code's drafters recognize this problem and search for an in­
termediate approach .24 Their new standard of scrutiny-reasona­
bleness review of the directors ' fairness determination-imports 
stricter scrutiny than would the business judgment rule, but also 
purports to block full fairness review by the courts .25 
At bottom, then, the Principles set up a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of validating self-dealing transactions approved by disinter­
ested directors . Unfortunately, the drafters do not fix the difficulty 
of rebuttal precisely; they leave this task to a case-by-case determi­
nation.26 The courts that decide those cases, in effect, will make a 
24. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 5 .02 (a) (2) (B) cmt . ,  at 292-300 (stating 
that disinterested-director approval upon full disclosure is not the substantive 
equivalent of arm's-length transacting) . 
25.  Compare id. § 4 .0  I (c) (3) (phrasing the business judgment rule in terms of rational 
belief in the corporation's best interests) with id. § 5.02 (a) (2) (B) (stating that a disinter­
ested director approving a self-dealing transaction must reasonably conclude that the 
transaction is fair to the corporation) . The drafters predict that the erection of  a busi­
ness-judgment shield to protect self-dealing transactions would not work in any event. 
In their view, the courts would unduly broaden such a rule in order to scrutinize the 
transactions. !d. § 5.02 (a) (2) (B) cmt. ,  at 292-300. 
26. The code's choice to accord legal effect to boardroom conflict resolution applies 
to all types of self-dealing transactions. !d. Part V introductory notes, at 263-70; id. 
§ 5.0 I cmt. c ,  at 2 7 1 -72 .  The particular effect varies with the circumstances. For self­
interested dealings such as contracts with the corporation or personal use of the corpo­
ration's property, disinterested-director approval shifts the burden of proof to the chal­
lenging party, and the substantive result can be voided only if the approving directors 
could not "reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair  to the corporation 
. . . . " !d. §§ 5.02 (a) (2) (B) ,  5 .04 (a) ( l ) ,  5 .04 (a) (4) ,  5 .04 (b) . In cases of executive-com­
pensation arrangements, competition with the corporation, and board decisions to de­
cline corporate opportunities made available by directors or officers interested in their 
private pursuit, the code shifts the burden of proof and restricts the reviewing court to 
business-judgment scrutiny. !d. §§ 5.03 (a) (2 ) ,  5 .03(b) ,  5 .05 (a) (3 ) (B) ,  5 .05 (c) , 5 .06(a) (2) ,  
5 .06(b) . I n  the case o f  a transaction between a corporation and a controlling share­
holder, the effect is more limited: The burden of proof shifts to the challenging party, 
id. § 5 . 1 0 (b ) ,  but the standard of scrutiny remains fairness, id. § 5 . l l (b ) .  
Under the code, a plaintiff who seeks to invalidate a transaction approved by disinter­
ested directors would be best advised to attack the adequacy of the board-approval pro­
cess. As a practical matter, a plaintiff must establish that the benefitted party obtained 
approval without disclosing a material fact .  !d. § 5.02 (a) ( I); see also id. § l . l 4 (a) (defining 
conflict-of-interest disclosure) ;  id. 1 . 1 4 (b) (defining transaction disclosure) . On its face, 
§ 5.02 makes adequate disclosure an independent requirement. Under § 5 .02(a) ( l ) ,  if 
the interested party has not made adequate disclosure to the corporate decisionmaker 
approving the transaction, the standard is violated without further inquiry into the fair­
ness of the transaction. This formulation is stricter than that contained in many state 
statutes. See, e.g. , DEL. CooE ANN. tit . 8, § 144 (a) (3) (rep!. vol . 1 99 1 )  (stating that ade­
quate disclosure is not required if the suspect transaction is "fair to the corporation") . 
The Principles' drafters , having put forth disclosure as the key to boardroom approxi­
mation of an arm's-length bargain, nonetheless draw back from the prospect of ques­
tions of liability for breach of duty turning on ex post judicial scrutiny of that 
disclosure's adequacy. First, they stress that failure to disclose constitu tes grounds for 
rescission but does not imply necessarily that the transaction has damaged the corpora­
tion. The defendant in such a case still may prove that the transaction was fair, and that 
the corporation, accordingly, suffered no damage. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 
1 993] 1 089 
normative choice that the drafters defer. They will determine the 
extent to which boardroom regulation of conflict-of-interest trans­
actions entails relaxation of the fiduciary norm. 
13. l'air77ess 
1. Directors' and Officers' Self-Dealing Contracts 
The code's concept of "fairness" is open-ended. The drafters do 
not attempt to define the term, presumably intending that its mean­
ing emerge in particular contexts , but they do report some definite 
ideas on the subject. The code contemplates "obj ective" scrutiny of 
self-dealing transactions: The deals must fall  within the "range of 
reasonableness. "27 As to contracts between directors and officers 
and the corporation, the drafters' draw on antecedent law to suggest 
three yardsticks for determining what is reasonable.  The first is con­
tractual-the transaction must be compared to an arm's-length 
transaction involving the same subject matter. The second looks to 
corporate purpose-the transaction must further the corporation's 
best interests in the sense of being a transaction into which the cor­
poration would enter even absent the self-interested tie . 28 The 
third is procedural-the approval process must show no undue 
pressure or other taint. 29 
Disinterested-director approval relaxes the intensity of the fair­
ness inquiry but does not change its substance. Under the relaxed 
standard, the reviewing court must decide that the transaction was 
"so clearly outside of the range of reasonableness" that the direc­
tors could not have concluded reasonably that it was fair.30 This 
standard contemplates something stricter than business judgment 
review. The code instructs the court conducting the inquiry to make 
a critical inspection of the entire record. Assume, for example, that 
a director owns a property. The director has marketed the property 
for $7.5 million but has only received bids in a range of $3 to $5 
million . The director then sells the property to the corporation for 
$7.5 million. A disinterested board approves the purchase based on 
an expert report which concludes that the property might be worth 
$7.5 million but that this sum lies at the high end of the range. The 
reviewing court, under the code, may look past the boardroom rec­
ord and conclude that the approving directors did not have an ade­
quate basis to support their conclusion that the transaction was 
1 ,  § 5.02(a) ( l )  cmt. , at 285-88. Furthermore, under § 5 .02(c) ,  defective disclosure can 
be cured. even after the filing of a suit, by ratification of the transaction after full disclo­
sure. !d. § 5 .02 (c) . The level of scrutiny accorded the transaction after the cure varies 
with the culpability of the earlier failure
. 
to disclose. If the nondisclosure involved bad 
faith, the original approval of the transaction has no legal effect and fairness scrutiny 
obtains. In the case of less culpable failures to disclose, the cure may relate back to the 
original approval to preclude scrutiny under the fairness standard. See id. § 5 .02 (c) cmt . ,  
at  308- 1 2 .  
2 7 .  !d. § 5 .02 (a)(2) (A) cmt. ,  at 289-92 .  
28 .  !d. 
29.  !d. 
30. !d. § 5.02 (a)(2 ) (B) cmt., at 292-300. 
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reasonable. 3 1  
2. Other Self-Dealing By Directors and Officers 
As to director and officer self-dealing transactions, the code re­
states the fairness standard of current law but then constrains its 
application if disinterested directors sanction the transaction at is­
sue. In treating some other situations ,  by contrast, the drafters take 
steps to compensate for the limited review following disinterested­
director approval by strengthening the applicable fairness 
standards .32 
The code's rule respecting uses of corporate property is particu­
larly notable in this regard.33 It amounts to an open-ended unjust­
enrichment standard. Section 5.04 contains a general prohibition 
against the use of corporate property, corporate position, or mate­
rial nonpublic corporate information to secure a pecuniary benefit 
3 1 .  !d. § 5.02(a)(2)(B) cmt.,  illus. 9, at 295-96. For a second example, assume that a 
disinterested board approves a sale of property to the corporation at a high price based 
on an inside appraisal they know to be unreliable and substantially higher than an earlier 
outside appraisal . !d. § 5 .02(a)(2)(B) cmt . ,  illus. 1 0 ,  at 296-97. Here too the court can 
disregard the corporate record and conclude that the board did not have a basis for 
concluding the transaction to be fair. 
This fairness inquiry, as articulated with regard to self-dealing contracts, is well­
mapped territory. The Principles here restate antecedent substantive law, but depart 
from it to restrict the scope of review in deference to disinterested-director determina­
tions . 
One other departure from prior law bears mention. The code constructs a new safe 
harbor for transactions between companies with common directors absent personal par­
ticipation or negotiation by the director with the conflict. !d. § 5 .07. According to the 
comment, only older cases apply fairness scrutiny to these transactions on a per se basis .  
!d. § 5.07 cmt. a ,  a t  4 1 2- 1 3. 
This relaxation of the rules attending interlocking boards accords with the spirit of 
our times. Interlocking boards were a political issue during the early part of this cen­
tury, when proponents of industrial and financial cooperation battled proponents of 
vigorous antitrust enforcement. See Ro N  CHERNO W ,  THE HousE OF MoRGAN: AN AMERI­
CAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 1 76-77 ( 1990) (describing 
Louis Brandeis' opposition to interlocking directorates between banks and industrial 
corporations) .  Lately, the tendency is to stress the productive benefits of cooperative 
ties. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps 
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 1 02 YALE L.J .  87 1 ,  904-05 ( 1 992) 
(describing the productive relationship that rests on "cross-ownership" in Japan) . 
32. Consider, for example, the Principles' treatment of corporate opportunities. Pro­
posed Final Draft, supra note I, § 5.05.  This section confirms that full-time officers have 
a duty to present opportunities in those lines of business that the corporation expects to 
engage in, as well as in its present lines of business, without regard to the opportunity's 
source or the capacity of its acquisition. Id. § 5.05(b)(2) (stating that an officer mus t  
"know" that the activity is "closely related" t o  a business in which the corporation "ex­
pects" to engage). Here the drafters opt to follow the s tricter rule of Rosenblum v. 
Judson Engineering. Corp., 1 09 A.2d 558, 563 (N.H. 1 954) (holding that the corporate 
opportunity doctrine applies where the opportunity is such that it should fairly belong to 
the corporation), over that ofGuth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A . 2 d  503, 5 1 0  (Del . 1 939) (holding 
the officer to a duty of good faith under the corporate opportunity doctrine). 
33. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 5 .04. 
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unless the use falls within listed exceptions .  34 The rule  breaks new 
structural ground35 by synthesizing a range of antecedent cases, 
many of which appear to have little in common. For example, the 
section's concept of use of property for "pecuniary benefit" encom­
passes both the sale of a corporate office36 and the act of preventing 
the corporation from pursuing an activity that the director desires to 
pursue for his or her own account. 37 
More controversially, the section makes insider trading a breach 
of fiduciary duty. A long line of authority holds that insider trading 
does not breach the duty of loyalty because the corporation suffers 
no injury.38 The drafters reject this approach and draw on the mis­
appropriation theory of federal insider-trading law to apply an un­
just-enrichment characterization; the trader uses a corporate 
position to secure an unauthorized benefit and therefore breaches 
the duty of fair dealing.39 
This treatment of insider trading has paradigmatic implications; it  
traverses a distinction long thought fundamental to the structural 
model of corporate law. His torically, the duty of loyalty is owed to 
the corporate entity and covers conduct pursued in a corporate ca­
pacity-that is, in the performance of a directorship or other of­
fice-as opposed to conduct pursued in a shareholding capacity. 
Transactions in shares fall outside of the traditional scheme of fidu­
ciary duties; a norm of self-interest has prevailed with respect to 
shareholder activities .40 Of course, this classical corporate dis tinc­
tion between corporate-level and shareholder-level activities has 
been much modified in some cases,41 but it has nevertheless per-
sisted in the law. The code's drafters break with history to disregard 
34. !d. § 5 .04 (a) . The exceptions contemplate, among other things, that uses of cor­
porate property may be qualified as self-dealing transactions through disinterested-di­
rector or shareholder approval, or qualified as compensation arrangements .  !d. 
§ 5 .04(a) ( l ) , .04 (a)(2) ,  .04 (a) (4 ) .  The upshot is that the chief executive officer who takes 
the corporate jet to a resort for a personal vacation must pay unless the use previously 
was included in the corporation 's  compensation plan as a job perquisite. See id. § 5 .04 
cmt. d(3) ,  at 368-74 . 
35 .  As usual, however, the drafters carefully limit the remedy. Here it is restricted 
to the return of the improper benefit and liability for any foreseeable harm to the corpo­
ration. !d. § 5 .04(c) . 
36. !d. § 5 .04 cmt. d ( l ) (f) , at 359. ·1 
37 .  !d. § 5 .04 cmt. d (l) (d) ,  at 355-56. 
38 .  See, e.g., Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prods. Co. ,  19 F.2d 24,  2 7-28 (8th Cir. ) ,  cert. 
denied, 275 U .S .  564 ( 1 927) ;  Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp . ,  23 N .W.2d 620, 627-32 (Wis .  
1 946) . 
39.  Proposed Final Draft, supra note I , § 5 .04 cmt. d(2) (a) , at 360-64 ; see Diamond v .  
Oreamuno, 248 N.E .2d 9 10, 9 1 2  (N.Y. 1 969) . But see Freeman v .  Decio ,  584 F .2d 1 86 
(7th Cir. 1 978) (rejecting the misappropriation theory under Florida law) .  
40. The self-interest norm is embedded in  the rule that controlling shareholders can 
sell their shares at a premium, above-market price without sharing with other share­
holders . See, e.g., Zetlin v.  Hanson Holdings, Inc . ,  397 N .E.2d 287 (N.Y.  1 979) . For the 
classic statement of the self-interest norm with respect to the vote, see Ringling Bros . ­
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v .  Ringling, 53 A.2d 44 1 (Del . 1 94 7)  ("a shareholder 
may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and i t  i s  not obj ectiona­
ble that his motives may be for personal profi t") .  
4 1 .  See infra note 59.  
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it entirely. Their "duty of fair dealing" is owed to both the corpora­
tion and its shareholders42 and thus cuts across the old categories . 
One result is that inside information easily can be characterized as 
corporate property, and its use in trading can become a breach of 
duty without a corporate-level injury .43 
3. Shareholder Freezeouts as Director Self-Dealing 
The code's elimination of the classical distinction between corpo­
rate- and shareholder-level duties necessitates structural adjust­
ments . Primary among them is the inclusion of manipulation-of­
dividend policy as one of the unfair uses of "corporate position" 
under section 5.04. Purposeful dis tribution of a benefit to share­
holders qua shareholders by means other than payment of dividends 
violates the section if some shareholders are unable to take advan­
tage of the benefit.44 The result is that close-corporation 
freezeouts , historically thought to give rise to breaches of duty at 
the shareholder level, fall into the same category as director and 
officer breaches .  As with insider trading, the drafters relax the his­
torical requirement of injury to the corporation. The prohibited 
combination of earnings retention and unequal dis tribution of em­
ployment benefits causes the corporate entity no harm. The grava­
men of the breach is injury to the shareholder by virtue of unequal 
distribution of benefits . 
It should be noted that this treatment of freezeout transactions 
does not break new ground by changing the results of cases. The 
shareholder-level duty is now well-es tablished. The drafters inno­
vate, however, by implying that equal treatment of shareholders is a 
norm of equal dignity with the notion of loyalty to the corporation 
as a whole.45 Although they do not expand or intensify the notion 
of fairness operating in present law expressly, the drafters clear a 
path that invites such results in future cases.46 
42 .  Proposed Final Draft, supra note I , § 5 . 04 cmt. d (2 ) (a) , at 360-64 . 
43 .  Section 5 .04 ' s  rules against the use of corporate information for personal bene­
fit balance the individual insider's interests in profitmaking pursuits against the firm's  
collective interest .  Under § 5 .04(a) (3) , corporate information generally may not be used 
for personal advantage unless (a) it is not inside information used in the trading of the 
firm's securities, (b) it  is not information designated as proprietary by the corporation, 
or (c) its use does not harm the corporation. !d. § 5 .04(a) ( 3 ) .  Thus, an employee may 
use corporate information in formulating a personal investment strategy , or may use 
nonproprietary information when taking employment elsewhere. See id. § 5 .04 cmt .  
d (2) (b ) ,  at 364-68 . 
Interestingly, under the code's unjust enrichment theory of insider trading, tipping is 
not a breach of duty per se. A breach occurs only if the tipper takes a cut of the tippee's 
profits ,  or if the corporation incurs costs as a result of an SEC enforcement proceeding. 
!d. § 5 .04 cmt .  d (2 ) (b ) ,  illus. 17 ,  at 367.  
44 .  !d. § 5 .04 cmt .  d ( l ) (c) , at 353-55.  
45.  See also supra text accompanying notes 40-43.  
46. The ?7-inciples · treatment of the creditors' interest in the corporation makes a 
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4. Duties of Controlling Shareholders 
A substantive corporate-level/shareholder-level distinction does 
survive in the code. The code applies different procedures and fair­
ness standards depending on the capacity in which the corporate 
actors act . Freezeouts are treated as corporate-level breaches be­
cause they result from the use of corporate property or office by 
directors or officers . In the freezeout fact pattern, the culpable di­
rectors and officers are also controlling shareholders , and the une­
qual distribution that violates their duty occurs at the shareholder 
level . But these culpable players do not undertake the breaching 
actions in a shareholding capacity. 
Where a controlling shareholder interacts directly with the corpo­
ration-for example, where a parent corporation contracts or inter­
feres with a majority-owned subsidiary-the code treats the case as a 
separate suspect transaction.47 It sets out standards for three such 
notable point of contrast. The drafters take "no position" on the matter of  corporate 
duties to creditors. !d. § 5 .04 cmt. c( l ) ,  at  34 1 - 43 .  They acknowledge that some observ­
ers favor a duty to creditors, but note that Part V "does not treat" the matter as such, 
leaving creditor protection to contract and bankruptcy law. /d. § 5 .04 reporter's note 
1 2 ,  at 376-77 ;  see also id. § 5 .04 cmt. d(2) (a), at 364 (noting that Part V does not address 
trading in debt securities ) .  
The drafters show only slightly more solicitude for the interests of  preferred stock­
holders. So long as the directors do not advance personal pecuniary interests , the draft­
ers would accord deference to the directors' decision to favor one class of preferred 
stock over another with respect to dividends or redemption. Failure to respect contract 
rights should result in a contract claim, not a claim for breach of fi duciary duty. /d. 
§ 5 .04 reporter's note 7 ,  at 376.  Zahn v. TransAmerica Corp . ,  1 62 F .2d 36 (3d Cir. 
1 947 ) ,  is carefully limited: Controlling shareholders have a duty not to use corporate 
property in a manner that excludes other "similarly situated" shareholders from partici­
pation in profits . Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1 ,  § 5 . 1 1  cmt. d (l) (d) ,  at  355-56; id. 
reporter's note 7 .  
There i s  sufficient similarity between bonds, preferred stock, and common stock­
viewed from the point of view of investors-to make the drafters' distinction hard to 
defend. See generally William W. Bratton Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a 
Time of Restructuring, 1 989 DuKE LJ. 92,  98- 1 0 1  (identifying three conceptions of corpo­
rate debt relationships and evaluating their role in response to restructuring related 
wealth transfers); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 
N.Y.U.  L. REv. 1 1 65, 1 1 67-7 1 ( 1 990) (examining the nature of corporate fiduciary rela­
tionships in the context of bondholders' rights) . The remission of the question of equal 
treatment of preferred stock to the category of business judgment matters is particularly 
surprising in view of the warmth with which the drafters embrace the idea of equal treat­
ment of common stockholders in § 5 .04. Nor does the device of "taking no position" on 
the subject of duties to creditors seem effective for its intended purpose. Even as they 
refrain from articulating a position, the Principles strongly imply that senior-security pro­
tection should be a contractual proposition. 
This treatment of senior securities strikes a dissonant note in the code. So far as 
shareholder-to-shareholder relationships are concerned, the drafters rework the law's 
very structure to embed in it a fairness principle previously articulated in a small but 
important body of cases .  Senior-security holders are remitted to their contract rights 
without discussion, even though they suffer many of the same problems of nonreciprocal 
treatment and unanticipated opportunism. Moreover, at least where close corporations 
are concerned, shareholders have as much opportunity to protect themselves by con­
tract as do bondholders. See infra Part I .B .4 .  
Of course, lines do have to  be drawn, and the code's line accords with the  views of the 
overwhelming majority of observers . See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and 
Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1 82 1  ( l 992 ) ; John C. Cof­
fee, Jr . ,  Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Afulti-Player Game, 78 GEo. LJ. 1495 
( 1 990) . So noting, however, does not make the line any less arbitrary. 
4 7. See infra notes 5 1 -53  and accompanying text . These sections substantiate the 
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situations. First, for transactions between a controlling shareholder 
and the corporation, it  articulates a fairness standard.48 Second, 
. carrying forward the principle of section 5.04, i t  rules that a control­
ling shareholder may not use corporate property or its control posi­
tion to secure a pecuniary benefit unless value is given and the 
transaction is fair, or the benefit is made proportionately available to 
other shareholders.49 Finally, it  extends a modified version of the 
corporate-opportunity rule to controlling shareholders .50 
Judicial scrutiny here is stricter than elsewhere in the code. The 
basic test is fairness, without provision for an automatic reduction in 
scrutiny upon approval by disinterested directors . 5 1  The drafters 
apparently assume that parents so control their subsidiaries' board 
rooms as to make pointless a provision for corporate-level input on 
the question of fair treatment. But, drawing on Weinberger v.  UOP, 
Inc., 52 the drafters indicate that procedural considerations s till will 
figure into judicial fairness determinations in these cases . The 
starting point for procedural fairness here, however, is not disinter­
ested-director approval, but the stronger check of the independent 
negotiating committee.s3 
The drafters thus make it harder to qualify these transactions pro­
cedurally. They go on, however, to compensate for this stricture by 
narrowing the substantive scope of the underlying duty . The con­
trolling shareholders ' duty, if articulated as an exact parallel of the 
directors' and officers ' duty imposed by the code, would prove mon­
umentally inconvenient to parent corporations . For example, the 
holdings of leading majority-to-minority shareholder cases like Jones v. H .  F .  Ahmanson 
& Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal .  1 969) ,  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 7 1 7  (Del .  1 971) , 
and Greene & Co. v. Dunhill International, Inc . ,  249 A.2d 427 (Del . Ch. 1 968) . 
The fairness duty obtains even though in the case of a controlling corporate share­
holder the managers making the decisions owe conflicting fiduciary duties to a second 
set of shareholders . Proposed Final D raft, supra note 1 ,  § 5 . 1 0  cmt. f, at 443 -45 .  
48 .  Proposed Final Draft ,  supra note 1 ,  § 5 . 1 0 (a) .  
49.  !d. § 5 . 1 1 (a) ( l ) - (2 ) . Section 5 . 1 1  sweeps in most majority-to-minority fact  pat­
terns not involving transactions . It covers, among other things, the parent's (a) misus­
ing a corporate position to obtain a tax benefit a t  a subsidiary ' s  expense, (b) misusing 
dividend policy, (c) precluding a subsidiary from engaging in a business opportunity, (d) 
precluding a subsidiary from competing with a parent, and (e) obtaining profit from the 
sale of property to the exclusion of other shareholders. See id. § 5 . 1 1  cmt. a,  at 448-50. 
50 .  !d. § 5 . 1 2 (a) . This section's definition of corporate opportunity is narrower than 
that in § 5 .05 (b) because the drafters assume that controlling shareholders have a right 
to engage in competition with controlled corporations. !d. § 5 . 1 2  cmt. d ,  at 4 7 1-77. As 
a practical matter, then, this corporate opportunity bar extends only to opportunities 
developed by a subsidiary and opportunities that come to a parent corporation by virtue 
of its relation to the subsidiary. !d. § 5 . 1 2 (b) ( l ) ,  (2) . 
5 1 .  !d. § 5 . l O (a) (2) , (b) (stating that disinterested-director ratification of control 
shareholder engagenent with corporation shifts burden of proof but does not change 
s tandard of review) ; id. § 5 . 1 2 (a) (2)  (stating that disinterested-shareholder ratification is 
necessary to insulate control shareholder from taking of corporate opportunity) . 
52. 457 A.2d 70 1 (Del. 1983) . 
53 .  Proposed Final Draft, supra note l, § 5 . 1 0  cmt. e, at 440-43 .  
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parent would have to channel significant business opportunities to 
the subsidiary54 and would be constrained from competing with it .55 
Mandated selflessness of this intensity would as a practical matter 
encourage the parent to eliminate the conflict of interest by means 
of a cash-out merger of the minority shares .56 The code's drafters 
draw the line before this point is reached . Although the controlling 
shareholder/parent may not prevent the subsidiary from competing 
with it ,  it has no duty to provide the subsidiary with the resources 
needed for competition, and, indeed, may compete with the subsidi­
ary to its injury. 57 Similarly, the corporate-opportunity bar applied 
to controlling shareholders is defined narrowly. 58 
5. Sales of Control 
The code's constraints on the use of corporate position for per­
sonal gain invite application to a case where a controlling share­
holder sells stock at a premium price. Because such a sale 
customarily entails stage-managed changes in board composition 
and office holding, it arguably involves the "use" of corporate posi­
tions . If further reference is made to the code's principle of equal 
distribution of benefits among shareholders, then a basis arises for 
imposing premium participation rights for outside shareholders 
upon the sale of a control block. 59 But here again,  the drafters care­
fully draw a line against the extension of their own equality princi­
ple. Under Section 5. 1 6, premium sales of controlling blocks 
constitute a breach of a duty to other shareholders only in two nar­
rowly defined classes of cases.60 
54 . Cf id. § 5 .05(b) .  
55 .  Cf id. § 5 .06(a) . 
56. Cf Victor Brudney & Robert C .  Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 
HARV. L. REv. 997,  1 057- 1 058 ( 1 98 1 )  (proposing a sharing rule for these s ituations as a 
means to encourage cash-out mergers ) .  
57. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I ,  § 5 .  I I  cml. c( I ) , at 4 50-52;  id. c(2) (B ) ,  a t  
453-55; id. d( l ) (a) , a t  457-59. 
58 .  See supra note 50.  
59. Such a sys tem was,  of course, advocated by a generation of commentators . The 
primary expos ition is William D.  Andrews, The Stockholder 's Right to  Equal Opportunity in the 
Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505,  5 1 5- 17 ( 1965 ) .  For support, see Victor Brudney, 
Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 296-99 
( 1 966) . For a more pointed antimanagerialist view of the case, see Richard W . Jennings, 
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL L. REv. I, 29-3 1 ( 1 956) (arguing that a controlling 
shareholder who sells at a premium should forfeit that premium lO the corporation ) .  
For a philosophical statement of  the case, see David C.  Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate 
Control, 1 1 2 U. PA. L. REv. 22 ( 1 963) . 
The suggestion of a sharing rule has been vigorously contested. See, e.g. , Frank H .  
Easterbrook & Daniel R .  Fischel, Corporate Control Tmnsactions, 9 1  YALE L..J . 698, 705-37 
( 1 982 ) .  For a suggestion that the existing cases do an effective job of separating harmful 
and beneficial transfers, see Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doc­
!nne, 59 U .  CHI .  L. REv. 1 465 ( 1 992 ) .  
60 .  The first case arises when the  purchaser also solicits sales from other holders. 
The shareholder selling the control block breaches a duty if i t  makes no disclosure of its 
transaction because of the risk that i t  might attempt to persuade the o ther shareholders 
to sell on less advantageous terms.  Proposed First Draft, supra note I ,  § 5 .  I 6 cml. d, at 
506-07 .  This is the rule of Brown v .  Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr.  78 1 ( 1 969) ,  without dicta 
about equal opportunity. The second case arises if i t  is "apparent from the circum­
stances" that the purchaser is likely to violate a duty of fair dealing in such a way as to 
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The drafters follow precedent here .61 But in so doing, they align 
themselves on one side of a long-running academic dispute about 
the implications of the traditional fairness standard. 52 This circum­
stance prompts the drafters to explain their normative choice, a rare 
event in their commentaries . The premium paid in these transac­
tions, they say, might have multiple sources. The purchaser might 
intend to pay either for the opportunity to improve the company's 
management or for the opportunity to exploit the position 
purchased. The drafters presume in favor of improved manage­
ment. They rely on a pair of empirical studies of control sales that 
show that the stock prices of the unsold minority blocks rise slightly 
following a sale.63 They determine, in effect, that control sales do 
not injure nonparticipating shareholders and may enhance their 
investments. 
This empirical position remains open to debate.64 Given the 
countervailing policy of shareholder equality that pervades the 
code, one senses a need for a fuller explanation. Interestingly, the 
policy that fills the bill is a policy that the drafters disavow expressly: 
The encouragement of transactions in the market for corporate con­
trol .65 That policy stems from efficiency considerations66-consid­
erations notably absent from the drafters' commentary in Part V.67 
obtain a significant financial benefi t .  Proposed Final Draft ,  supra note I ,  § 5 . 1 6  cmt. e, at 
509 . This is ,  of course, a careful abstraction of the rule of Perlman v. Feldmann ,  2 1 9 
F .2d 1 73 (2d Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 349 U .S .  952 ( 1 955) . 
6 1 .  See, e.g. , Clagget v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1 259, 1 262 (4th Cir. 1 978) ;  Zetlin v. 
Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N .E .2d 387, 388-89 (N.Y. 1 979) . 
62 .  See supra note 2 .  
63 .  Proposed Final Draft, supra note I ,  § 5 . 1 6  cmt .  c,  at 504-06; id. reponer's note  I ,  
at 5 1 3- 1 5 . The studies are Michael Bradley, !nterfmn Tender Offers and the Market for Corpo­
rate Control, 53 J .  Bus . 345 ( 1 980) , and Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The 
Role of ,\!fayority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 20 J .  FIN.  EcoN . 3 1 7  ( 1 988) . 
64. In showing that the stock of the noncontrolling shareholders does not decline in 
value around the time of the sale, the studies do not foreclose the possibility that the 
noncontrolling shareholders nevenheless bear an exploitation cost in connection with 
the sale. 
65 .  Part VI, directed to transactions in control and tender offers, begins with the 
admonition that i t  reflects no 'judgment on the economic, social and political issues 
posed by hostile takeovers ."  Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1 ,  Part VI introductory 
note, at 5 1 7-23 .  
66 .  Under generally accepted theory, the threat of a hostile control transfer reduces 
agency costs by encouraging better management performance. The transfer transac­
tion, moreover, moves the assets to a higher-valuing user, and-absent a controlling 
shareholder and given a competitive market-the shareholders participate pro rata in 
most of the value increase. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE Eco­
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CoRPORATE LAw 1 7 1 -74 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
67 .  Corporate control policy also shapes a companion rule directed t o  management 
buyouts-transactions in which the corporation's managers purchase a control block 
from public shareholders either by a negotiated merger or by a tender offer. The code 
treats these transactions in the same manner as it  does control-shareholder engage­
ments . A safe harbor is  available, but only if the management gToup gives the market an 
opportunity for free play respecting control of the corporation. This "market check" 
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C. Opting Out 
The Principles ' fiduciary standards, like those under present state 
law, are for the most part mandatory. The code explicitly constrains 
the power of individual corporations to vary the duty's terms and to 
promulgate their own less rigorous standards .68 The drafters thus 
make a basic assumption that free contract does not operate in the 
world of corporate governance. 
The code does accord corporations a limited freedom to promul­
gate their own "standards ."  These can specify self-dealing transac­
tions ,  uses of property, or business opportunities, and provide 
advance permission for their undertaking by officers and directors . 59 
Convenience is the s tated rationale.7° The drafters aspire to open a 
field for the easy synchronization of the legal governance model and 
the practice of the individual firm. But they remain protective of the 
legal model's integrity. A grant of advance permission should not 
imply abandonment of oversight by the board, say the drafters . 7 1  
Nor should individual firms be permitted to  "dispense generally 
with or generally modify" the code's substantive and procedural 
rules .72 
involves the strictest procedural rules in Part V. Management must make public disclo­
sure and must give interested parties relevant information and a reasonable opportunity 
to submit a competing proposal, and disinterested shareholders must ratify the transac­
tion . In addition, disinterested directors must oversee the market offering process.  See 
id. § 5 . 1 5  cmt. c (3 ) ,  at 492-99. 
The fairness standard here is the arm's  length bargain, but in a s tricter version. Gar­
den-variety self-dealing transactions of directors and officers can qualify based on hypo­
thetical reference to market transactions; the insider does not have to submit to the 
possibility of being outbid. Here, qualification of the transaction presupposes an actual 
opportunity for outside third parties to outbid the insider. !d. § 5 . 1 5  (b) ( l ) . These strict 
standards presumably stem from recognition of the importance of management buyout 
transactions to the shareholder beneficiaries of the duty. The whole company, after all, 
is being sold. But this immediate shareholder interest in the highest price does not 
provide a complete explanation. Ordinary self-dealing transactions conceivably can 
have a very significant bearing on corporate performance and shareholder returns, but 
do not require a "market check." Moreover, in the case of insider sales of control-as 
opposed to insider purchases of control-the fact that control has gone onto the block 
does not give rise to enough concern about shareholder participation to cause the 
drafter to shape an aggressive fiduciary rule. 
For a complete explanation, a policy favoring free play of the corporate control mar­
ket and an attendant long-run vision of shareholder interest must be inferred. Manage­
ment buyouts are transactions in that market, but are unlikely to realize maximum 
returns for shareholders. The management purchasers have a defensive incentive to 
initiate the transaction. They control its timing and have power to withhold information 
from potential competing bidders . To the extent they can exercise these powers with 
impunity, the scope and disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control dimin­
ishes. For discussion of the dangers of management buyouts , see generally Deborah 
DeMott, Puu.les and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the J\11 BO Context, 2 5  WAKE FoREST L. 
REV. 1 5, 3 1 -34 ( 1 990) (providing examples of bad faith behavior of  management during 
management buyouts) , and Dale A. Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, .Management Buyouts: Cre­
ating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth ?, 4 1  VAND. L. REV. 207, 2 1 8-22 ( 1 988) (describing 
potential for abuse in management buyouts) . 
68. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I ,  § 5 .09.  
69. !d. 
70.  !d. § 5.09 cmt. a, at 423-24. 
7 1 .  !d. § 5 .09 cmt.  c ,  at 424-30. 
72 .  !d. § 5 .09 cmt.  d, at 430-35.  
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D. Summary 
On one level, the code restates existing law. The drafters for the 
most part stay close to the exis ting body of case rulings. But they 
superimpose new structural principles on the law's existing pattern .  
The new principles send mixed normative signals . By institutional­
izing disinterested-director approval, they make fiduciary regulation 
a matter of internal corporate governance. This adjustment implies 
that the values of business people will henceforth determine the 
content of "fairness ,"  with dilutive substantive results . On another 
level, the drafters reject the proposition that contractual choice 
should prevail over the law's  fiduciary norm in corporate contexts . 
They also raise shareholder-level fairness duties , once the exception 
in corporate law, to a status of equal dignity with director and officer 
duties. These steps imply that the meaning of "fairness" is still up 
to lawmakers to determine ,  and that stricter applications of the 
norm may be legitimate. 
The rest of this Article identifies and resolves some of the ten­
sions created by these mixed normative signals .  
I I. Traditional Fiduciary Law, Corporate Governance Policy, and 
the Choices that Shape the Principles ' Fiduciary Code 
The code's drafters make no sustained attempt either to explain 
why we have fiduciary duties or to justify their own formulations. 
They do not refer to efficiency considerations .  They do not refer to 
a need for management disempowerment. Nor do they refer to an 
ethic of self-sacrifice or a similar value-laden concept .  In general , 
they take fiduciary duty, and a constituent notion of justice as fair­
ness ,  as giVen. 
The drafters do make a few telling comments. Cumulated, these 
amount to a tender of a beginning of an explanation. An executive 
who takes the corporate jet on personal business should pay, they 
say, because shareholders have a "right to expect" payment of fair 
value .73 This implies an assumption that "shareholder expecta­
tions" explain and justify corporate fiduciary law. Unfortunately, 
the drafters say nothing about their basis for assuming the empirical 
"expectations" on which the justification relies . 
Elsewhere, the drafters tell us that the code's  mandatory aspect is 
a consequence of "public policy ."  They observe that the sharehold­
ers cannot foresee the consequences of broad-brush waivers ; there­
fore, their informed consent to them cannot be assumed. 74 
Res tating this point, the drafters assume that corporate governance 
73. !d. § 5 .04 cmt. d (3 ) ,  a t  368-74 . 
74 .  /d. § 5 .09 cmt. d (2 ) ,  ar. 433-35 .  
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is not a field well-suited to free contract ;  therefore, "public policy" 
requires it to be regulated. Unfortunately, we are left to ourselves 
to determine the origins and content of this "public policy . "  We 
also are left on our own to apply the policy to support the particular 
regulations adopted by the drafters. 
This part of this Article begins the job of filling in the explanation 
omitted by the drafters . First, it describes discussions about the na­
ture and scope of fiduciary duty that went on in the background at 
the time the code was drafted. Second, it considers the code against 
this background and isolates the theoretical choices implicit in the 
drafters' work. These are, first, the choice of an open-ended de­
scription of the corporation,  and, second, the choice of a mediative 
normative framework. 
A.  The Loss of Confidence in Corporate Fiduciary Law 
The Principles ' fiduciary code appears at the end of a period of 
dispute over the nature and justification of corporate fiduciary du­
ties .  This dispute addressed an old problem that inheres in all dis­
cussions of fiduciary law. 
Fiduciary relationships present a problem of legal classification.  
They l ie in a gray area between the more clearly defined worlds of 
government regulation and private ordering through contract. 
They plausibly can be characterized as a species of either. Because 
the fiduciary acts on another's behalf,75 the relationship implies a 
beneficiary needing protective regulation. But fiduciary relation­
ships also are volitionaF6 and inevitably entail a measure of private 
ordering, in many cases a large measure . As a result, the same fidu­
ciary relationship may be the subject of two sharply contrasting de­
scriptions with contrasting normative implications . Depending on 
the factors emphasized, either legally mandated self-sacrifice or un­
constrained pursuit of self-interest in an environment of free con­
tract may be implied. 
Disagreement over these choices pervades recent discussions of 
corporate fiduciary law. This academic story briefly can be retold .77  
1 .  Traditional Fiduciary Law and Antimanagerialist Corporate Policy 
Traditional fiduciary law favors beneficiary protection over fiduci­
ary volition. The doctrinal literature asserts , plausibly enough, that 
a legal constraint against self-dealing is implicit in the structure of 
75. See generally I AusTIN W. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 43  (4th ed.  1 987)  (defining 
the fiduciary's  role in terms of action for the benefit of another party as to matters within 
the relationship's scope) .  
76.  The fiduciary accepts a power on condition that  it be exercised in the benefici­
ary's interes ts. J .C .  Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAw 
Q REv. 5 1 ,  75 ( 1 98 1 ) .  In the case of agency relationships, the acceptance ripens into 
express agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt .  a ( 1 958) . 
77 .  For a more detailed retelling, see William W. Bratton, Self Interest and Good 
Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law (Nov. 1 992)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) . 
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fiduciary relationships .  These relationships-characterized by ac­
tion on another party's behalf and power in the acting party accom­
panied by dependence on the other's part78-have qualitatively 
different premises than relationships in the world of private order­
ing. 79 Accordingly, classical contract law, which assumes pure self­
interest on the part of contracting actors,80 cannot provide an ap­
propriate regulatory framework. The doctrinal result is a black-let­
ter line separating contract from fiduciary law. 
The traditional commentary justifies the imposition of the fiduci­
ary's legal duty on two grounds. One is ethical-fiduciary exercise 
of power for self-interested reasons is wrong. The ethic can be 
stated positively or negatively. In the positive statement, the ethical 
fiduciary acts out of good will toward the beneficiary. In the nega­
tive statement, the ethical fiduciary abjures self-interested pur­
suits .8 1 The other justification is practical-the imposition of the 
duty facilitates productive relationships, whether of trust or of 
agency. 
These traditional fiduciary principles present special problems 
when applied in corporate contexts . The basic relational fit is easy: 
The corporate manager takes the fiduciary role, exercising power 
that affects the interests of a dependent shareholder-beneficiary . 
The problem is that the fit is never perfect. In business situations ,  
wealth creation can be as much a matter of entrepreneurial initiative 
as a matter of performance of a trust .  Corporate relationships are 
driven by self-interest, present on all sides and known to all 
participants. 
The corporate version of the duty of loyalty recognizes the possi­
bility of legitimate, self-interested conduct by those in charge of cor­
porations at the same time that it burdens them with a standard of 
self-sacrifice. To this end, it moderates the standard of selflessness 
upon the performance of qualifying procedures .82 The procedures , 
in theory, move the transaction out of the relational framework of 
power and dependence toward arm's-length dealing. The Principles, 
78. See Shepherd, supra note 76, at 68-69; Ernest J .  Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 
25 U. ToRONTO L.J . 1 ,  4 ( 1 975) .  
79 . The fact that many fiduciary relationships arise out o f  planned transactions does 
not obviate this point. Weinrib, supra note 78, at 3 ;  see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduoary Law, 
7 1  CAL. L. REv. 795 ,  798 ( 1 983) (s tating that fiduciary relationships combine qualities of 
bargained-for contracts with a form of the power and dependence of s tatus relations) . 
80. Restating the point in Macneillian terms,  it enhances discreetness and presenta­
tion normatively. IAN R .  MACNE IL,  THE NEw SociAL CoNTRACT: AN I N QU I RY INTO MoD­
ERN CoNTRACTUAL RELATIONS 59-64 ( 1 980) . 
8 1 .  For an extended discussion of the traditional commentary, see generally Brat­
ton, supra note 77. 
82. The initial modification occurred at the turn of the centurv. See ROBERT C .  
CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW 1 60-66 ( 1 986) ;  Harold Marsh, Jr . , Are Directo;·s Trustees P Conflict 
of Interest and C01porate Aforality, 22 Bus.  LAW. 35, 36- 40,  43 ( 1 966) . The PrinCiples offer, 
in effect, a state-of- the-an presentation of the modified body of rules. 
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as we have seen, ratify and expand this approach, enhancing the 
legal effect accorded the judgment of the approving board . 83 
This model of accommodation is a topic of continuing disagree­
ment. Its supporters take the position that a stricter trust  model of 
fiduciary duty makes no sense in business contexts and that this ac­
commodation is a reasonable solution to a special regulatory prob­
lem. To the model 's antimanagerialist detractors, contingent 
fiduciary duties are a part of a larger, unsatisfactory legal system of 
corporate governance. 
The antimanagerialist attack proceeds as follows.  Because public 
shareholders cannot as a practical matter control managers through 
the franchise ,  managers exercise their considerable  power absent an 
adequate mechanism to assure accountability. Without an assur­
ance of accountability, efficient production will not be achieved.84 
Relaxed fiduciary standards contribute to this governance problem. 
The system's procedures for qualifying self-interested managerial 
conduct are intrinsically ineffective because the managers control all 
internal decisionmaking processes in fact if not in name. Further­
more, investors expect a firm base of legal protection as a condition 
for parting with their capital . S trong fiduciary law supports this ex­
pectation, lowering the cost of capital and thus performing an effi­
ciency function. 8s 
This antimanagerialist case for heightened corporate fiduciary 
regulation bears a family resemblance to the traditional doctrinal 
justification for all fiduciary duties. Both approaches lead to the 
same conclusion-that a strong conceptual barrier should be er­
ected to separate fiduciary and ordinary contract relationships. But 
the overlap is not complete. The corporate case rests on a practical 
imperative-the need to protect investors . That imperative in turn 
depends on a particular picture of corporate power allocation and 
governance policy. The traditional story, in contrast ,  combines a 
similar practical imperative with an ethical justification for fiduciary 
self-sacrifice. The latter justification does not usually figure into 
these corporate discussions. 86 
2. Corporate Law Under a Rational Expectations Paradigm 
The introduction of a microeconomic model of the corporation in 
8 3 .  See supra text accompanying notes 14 - 1 9 .  
84 . Th is i s  the problem o f  the separation o f  ownership a n d  control, identified i n  
ADOLF A .  BERLE & GARDINER C.  MEANS, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION A N D  PRIVATE PRoP­
ERTY ( 1 932 ) ,  and discussed ever since. 
85. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein, Towards A Federal Fiducimy Sta ndards Act, 30 CLEV. 
ST. L. REv. 203, 2 1 8- 1 9  ( 1 98 1 )  (arguing that investors assume a high level of protec­
tion) ;  David M. Phill ips, Managerial Afisuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate 
Doctrine, 32 RuTGERS L. REv.  1 84 ,  2 1 9-20 ( 1 979) (stating that fulfill ing expectations 
reduces costly uncertainty ) .  See generally Bratton, supra note 7 7 .  
8 6 .  The custom is t o  dismiss fiduciary law's tendency t o  speak i n  moral terms a s  a 
rhetorical phenomenon. See Robert C .  Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRIN­
CIPALS AND AGENTS : THE STRUCTURE O F  BusiNESS 75 (John W. Pratt & Richard J .  
Zeckhauser eds . ,  1 985) . For a contrary approach , see Lawrence E .  Mitchell, The Death of 
Fiducim)' Duty in Close Corpomt1ons, 1 38 U .  PA. L. REv. 1 675,  1 692-99 ( 1 990) . 
1 1 02 [VOL. 6 1 : 1 084 
Bratton 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
the early 1980s countered the antimanagerial case for intensified fi­
duciary controls .  The economic model discards the doctrinal dis­
tinction between contract and fiduciary relationships .  I t  assumes 
that individual self-interest motivates all relationships ,  whatever 
their traditional legal classification .87 Self-interested conduct, as a 
result, does not automatically prompt normative disapproval . All 
corporate actors become rational figures who take contractual steps 
to protect themselves . Thus modeled, shareholders do not neces­
sarily expect strict legal protection under the fiduciary rubric. In­
stead, they primarily rely on competition in the market for corporate 
control and the market for executive skills to assure protection of 
their interests. 
Under the economic model, fiduciary duties do not inhere in cor­
porate relationships .  Under its picture of universal contracting, no 
intrinsic need for legal regulation may be presumed. Legal duties 
can be justified only by showing that private actors given full infor­
mation in a costless contracting environment would have agreed to 
them.88 Fiduciary rules thus are reconstituted as contractual gap­
fillers . By implication, they should yield to contrary agreement or 
"opting out" by the actors in a particular corporation. 
This theoretical challenge to mandatory fiduciary duties was ex­
haustively discussed in the law reviews . In the end, the commentary 
confirmed the mandate's legitimacy. It was decided that process de­
fects make the corporate charter amendment-the means to the end 
of opting out-an inappropriate context for complete freedom of 
contract, even when viewed through the lens of an economic model. 
Shareholders have a collective-action problem when managers pro­
pose charter amendments . Small s takes make it irrational for indi­
vidual holders to invest in information acquisition. 89 Moreover, 
managers , by virtue of their control of the structure and timing of 
the amendment process ,  easily can turn the shareholder' s inferior 
87 . This model caused an abrupt change in the political economics of corporate law 
during the 1 980s. It tells the s tory of corporate organization in terms of the voluntary 
and purposeful interaction of rational free actors in a competitive environment. It was 
first articulated in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage­
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Stmcture, 3 J .  FIN.  EcoN. 3 1 0  ( 1 976) .  For the 
leading legal application, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66. For a purer legal 
application of the model, see Henry N .  Butler & Larry E.  Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Response to the A nti-Contractarians, 65 WASH .  L. REv. 1 ( 1 990) . 
88.  See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 1 5; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The 
i\.1andatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUtv! .  L. REv. 1 549,  1 550-5 1 ( 1 989) . The 
reconception of corporate relationships in terms of microeconomic agency relationships 
causes many of the injuries recognized by corporate and securities law to disappear. See, 
e.g., jonathan R.  Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 1 3  HoFSTRA L. REv. 9, l O- l l  ( 1 984) . 
89. See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr. , No Exit ?: Optlng Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corpo­
ration, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 9 1 9, 933-35 ( 1 988) ; Gordon, 
su,iJra note 88,  at 1 575-77.  
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negotiating position to advantage.90 The result is a contract failure: 
The shareholders rationally vote to approve an amendment that is 
value decreasing to them. Accordingly, broad-brush abolitions of 
fiduciary duties by charter amendments sometimes should be sub­
ject to mandatory regulation even under a microeconomic para­
digm.9 1 As noted above, the drafters of the Principles draw on this 
rationale to justify the code's constraint on opting out.92 
The microeconomic model of corporate law thus failed to accom­
plish a deregulatory policy mission. But its methodology did suc­
ceed in becoming the ordinary framework for evaluating corporate 
law problems. The academic ratification of mandatory fiduciary 
duty was articulated in a rational-expectations format .  Traditional 
notions of power, dependence, and ethical constraint did not figure 
into the discussion. 
Fiduciary law emerged from this debate in a weakened theoretical 
posture .93 Although few scholars today view corporate governance 
as a matter of contract success, most nevertheless view it as a species 
of contracting problem. Legal intervention, in turn, has come to 
be viewed as a less than satisfactory solution. From a rational­
expectations point of view, the shareholder plaintiff in an action for 
breach of fiduciary duty is every bit as much an opportunist as the 
management defendant.94 Moreover, the "shareholder expecta­
tions" that once justified legal intervention now look much differ­
ent . The efficient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing 
model highlight pathways for partial shareholder self-protection;95 
shareholders who can protect themselves to some extent presuma­
bly "expect" less in the way of legal protection .96 In addition, the 
90. Gordon, supra note 88, at 1 57 7-84 . Professor Coffee s tressed this problem of 
"agenda manipulation" over the rational apathy s tory. He pointed out that sharehold­
ers easily can just say no, but that management's ability to manipulate the agenda s tilts 
the whole corporate contracting process .  John C.  Coffee, Jr. ,  The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in C01porale Law: An Essay on the judicial Role, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 6 1 8 , 1 674-75 & 
n .234 ( 1 989) . 
9 1 .  Under the consensus view, the amendment process is deemed reliable for 
amendments that are company-specific and transaction-specific-for example, poison 
pills or s tock option plans .  But for general, open-ended proposals-for example, broad­
brush abolition of director and officer fiduciary duties-contract failure is probable. See 
Coffee, supra note 90, at 1 664-65; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Stm.cture of C01poration Law, 
89 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 46 1 ,  1 469-70 ( 1 989) ; Gordon, supra note 88 ,  at 1 593-97 ;  Robert B .  
Thompson, The Law 's Limits o n  Contracts in a Corporation, 1 5  J .  CoRP. L.  3 7 7 ,  388  ( 1 990) . 
92 .  See supra text accompanying note 74 .  
93. For a recent inspection of the whole body of fiduciary law from a rational-expec­
tations perspective, see Robert Cooter & Bradley J .  Freedman, The Fiduciary Relallonship: 
Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U.  L. REv . 1 045 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
94 . See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, a t  99- 1 00; Jason S . Johnston, Opting 
In and Optzng Out: Bargazning for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperatzve Ventures, 70 WAS H .  U. L.Q 
29 1 ,  3 1 2-320 ( 1 992) . 
95.  For discussion of these theories and their l imitations as a basis for normative 
decisions, see Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Sewritres Regulation: i\1ar­
ket Efficiency Revist ted, 140  U .  PA. L. REv. 85 1 ( 1 992) .  
96. The capital asset pricing model asserts that, because investors can diversify un­
systematic risk from their portfolios, they only will be rewarded for bearing market risk. 
See VICTOR BRUDNEY & vVILLIAM vV. B RATTON ,  BRUDNEY AND C H I RELSTEI N ' s  CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CoRPO RATE FINANCE 98- 1 1 2 (4th ed. 1 993) . The inference arises that 
inves tors can protect themselves from breaches of fiduciary duty: because management 
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proportion of institutional shareholding has increased, and some 
ins titutional representatives have become active and even intermit­
tently effective in corporate governance. Shareholders conse­
quently appear less and less well-suited to the victim's role .  I t  no 
longer seems safe to assume that mandatory self-abnegation among 
managers promotes investor confidence and lowers the cost of capi­
tal . The idea of investor protection, which formerly served as the 
justification for introducing traditional values of fiduciary law into 
corporate governance discussions, now carries little weight as a pol­
icy imperative. 
The economic critique also increased sensitivity to the costs of 
enforcing fiduciary duties . The direct costs of litigation constitute 
only a part of this problem. Questions also arise about the ins titu­
tional competence of courts. Although courts apply the business 
judgment rule to limit inquiry into investment and management 
decisionmaking,97 conflicts of interest  for the most part have been 
held to lie outside of the forbidden territory. Lately, however, aca­
demics have come to view conflict-of-interest problems as economic 
puzzles for technical solution.98 The litigation process is an intrinsi­
cally suboptimal mode for working through to the solution of 
problems thus characterized . 
In sum, the prevailing disposition is to read the inherited body of 
corporate fiduciary law narrowly and to presume that any expansion 
of its reach is prohibitively costly absent a clear contrary showing.99 
self-dealing is an unsystematic risk, i t  can be diversified out. See EASTERBROOK & Fis­
CHEL, supra note 66, at 1 22- 1 24 .  
97 .  See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I ,  § 4 .0 1 ;  id. § 4 .0 l (c) cmt . ,  a t  227-44 ;  id. 
reporter's note 2, at 245 .  
98 .  See, e.g. , Johnston, supra note 94 ,  a t  3 1 2  (outlining possible "game" stages ) .  
99 .  For notably narrow recent readings, see, for example, EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supm note 66, at 90- 1 08, and Johnston, supra note 94, at 3 1 0- 1 1 (describing the likeli­
hood that expansive courts might reward baseless claims) .  Corporate governance com­
mentators have given up on the prospect of effective market controls of management to 
grapple anew with the old problem of management accountability. Ten or fifteen years 
ago, commentaries dealing with accountability problems often recommended revised 
fiduciary rules as a solution. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares 
in Corporale Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297, 3 1 3-25 (arguing that gains from 
parent subsidiary mergers should be divided equally as a percentage of premerger val­
ues ) ;  Brudney & Clark, supra note 56, at 1 022-42 (recommending categorical prohibi­
tion of full-time executives of public corporations from taking other busiw:ss 
opportunities ) .  Today, the governance debate focuses on self-help by institutional in­
vestors rather than direct legal control under the fiduciary rubric. See, e.g. , Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH . L. REv. 520 ( 1 990) (setting forth eco­
nomic analysis showing that institutional-investor involvement is cost effective) ; John C. 
Coffee, Jr . ,  Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 9 1  CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1 277 ,  1 355-57 ( 1 99 1 )  (arguing for legal reforms designed to encourage institu­
tional-investor participation in corporate governance) ; Ronald ] .  Gilson & Reiner Kraak­
man, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN . L. REv . 
863, 905 ( 1 99 1 )  (urging voluntary monitoring organization) . I t  should be noted that 
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B. Theoretical Implications of the Principles' Fiduciary Code 
1. The A voidance of Political and Economic Theory 
The Principles are not offered as a "restatement" of corporate law. 
Indeed, corporate law's inherited structure causes many of the gov­
ernance problems to which they are addressed. They accordingly 
recommend changes in the legal model of governance structure . 
These changes center on a monitoring model of board responsibil­
ity and a practice of nominating a majority of outside directors . 100 
The drafters hope that these devices will cure the governance prob­
lem cooperatively, without full-scale government intervention. In 
the drafters' projection, outside directors will monitor actively and 
thereby prevent the worst excesses of management empowerment. 
The realization of their reform aspirations depends on this projec­
tion's accuracy. I o 1 
The effectiveness of the Principles ' fiduciary code also depends on 
this projection's accuracy . The monitoring model ' s  reliance on the 
outside director parallels the fiduciary code's empowerment of the 
disinterested director. This is the primary conceptual link between 
the Principles ' structural and fiduciary parts . 
If we put this link to one side and consider the fiduciary code in 
isolation, it quickly takes on many of the properties of a res tatement. 
It mostly ratifies the results of the decided cases and purveys fiduci­
ary law as a closed legal system. It is composed of "principles ,"  but 
not principles rationally derived from a stated body of policy as­
sumptions, whether political or economic in character. Indeed, the 
drafters avoid references to political and economic paradigms of 
corporate production. 1 02 Their commentaries ins tead s tay very 
much in a t.-aditional mold and refer randomly to the cumulation of 
present legislation, to past judicial precedent, and to corporate 
practice. 
This positivist methodology works well for a project that purports 
only to restate the law, but it goes against the grain of prevailing 
academic standards respecting the articulation of legal "principles . "  
Most observers today assume that a body o f  legal principles cannot 
be understood or justified adequately as a closed sys tem that makes 
reference only to its own stated prernises. 1 03 The habit is to support 
practical reasons support this; rules against self-dealing do not tend to address directly 
the problem of ineffective management .  
A contrary position in favor of fiduciary litigation as a governance tool is in the  early 
stages of articulation. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual 
Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 80,  205-08 ( 1 992) ;  Charles M .  Yablon, Overcompensating: 
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 CoLUr>l . L. REv. 1 867,  1 867-70 ( 1 992) (review­
ing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcEss ( 1 99 1 ) ) (arguing that corporate law should 
play a larger role in curtailing outrageous executive compensation arrangements ) .  
1 00. See, e.g. , Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1 ,  § §  3 . 02 ,  3A.O l .  
1 0 1 .  See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text. 
1 02 .  See supra text accompanying note 73 .  
1 03 .  Cf Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.j .  1 1 1 3  
( 1 98 1 )  (dividing legal scholarship into three categories-doctrinal analys is ,  social sci­
ence analysis ,  and normative analysis-and warning that doctrinal analysis is currently 
endangered in the law schools ) .  Today, academic treatments of corporate law tend to 
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legal s tructures by reaching to outside economic, political , and so­
cial imperatives . That habit by now is so deeply ingrained that the 
Principles become noteworthy for their limited frame of reference. 
Further explanation and justification are appropriate. 
Some reasons for the limitation suggest themselves. First, the 
Principles, as an ALI project, are directed primarily to legal decision 
makers . 104 They import action in the world of practice rather than 
explanation at the level of theory. In our polity, ideological trap­
pings make a plan of action less plausible. The drafters' method­
ological restraint thus follows from the seriousness with which they 
take their self-declared role. 
Second, reference to outside political and economic frameworks 
would be an awkward exercise for the drafters of this particular 
code. Their product offers little to satisfy theorists of the corpora­
tion, whether proponents of the microeconomic corporation or 
antimanagerialis ts. 
Consider first economic theories of the firm. They influence the 
code here and there. The drafters limit remedies carefully to dis­
courage speculative litigation; 1 05 the policy of protecting the market 
for corporate control shows its hand . 1 06 But the code on the whole 
proceeds without regard to the economic theory of the firm. It  un­
questioningly accepts an undefined fairness principle as a limit on 
contractual innovation in corporate governance. And it reaches out 
to chill entrepreneurship with its strict constraints on insider trad­
ing, corporate opportunities, and the privileges of controlling 
shareholders . 
Now consider the antimanagerialist frame of reference . The Prin­
ciples, by recommending alterations in the legal model of corporate 
structure, implicitly share the antimanagerialists' concern about cor­
porate accountability. But antimanagerialists will question the law­
making role that the fiduciary code accords to the disinterested 
director. It is one thing to suggest structural modifications of gov­
ernance processes in the hope that outside directors will prove to be 
effective. It is another thing to recommend present changes in the 
system of substantive controls provided by fiduciary law based on 
the same hope. The drafters identify no concrete basis to support 
the conclusion that board level, conflict-resolution processes ade­
quately protect investor interests . The antimanagerialist thus 
evaluate law as a means to the end of wealth maximization and look beyond legal 
sources to economic analysis for guidance on particular maximization s trategies. 
I 04. Segments of the code carry a recommendation respecting implementation by 
judges or legislamres. See, e.g. ,  Proposed Final Draft, supra note I ,  § 4 .0 1 cmt. b ,  at 1 84 ;  
id. § 5.02 cmt. b, at 28 1 .  
1 05 .  SeP supra notes 26 and 3 5 .  
i 06 .  See supra text accompanying notes 65-67 . 
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should conclude that the disinteres ted-director barrier to fairness 
review serves to complete a century-long process of  eviscerating the 
corporate duty of loyalty . 1 07 
2. The Implicit Description 
The drafters solve no problems by choosing a traditional mode of 
explanation and avoiding mention of current theories of the firm. 
Hard descriptive and normative choices inherent in discussions of 
fiduciary law do not disappear conveniently with the choice of a doc­
trinal framework of inquiry. The drafters of this code make some of 
these choices and defer others . In both cases they refrain from dis­
cussing their choices explicitly . 
Let us review their descriptive choices and fill in some of this dis­
cussion. They begin the code by announcing a contractual descrip­
tion: The duty at issue is one of "fair dealing," not "loyalty. " 1 08 
This at first looks l ike a foundational decision to emphasize the con­
tractual aspects of corporate relationships .  But it turns out to lack 
powerful descriptive implications because the code does not recon­
struct situations of power and dependence as situations of arm's­
length bargaining. 
Thus, despite the new title, the drafters ' corporation is not con­
tractual in an economic or doctrinal sense. What then is the opera­
tive description of the firm? The code's uneasy combination of 
mandate and accommodation presupposes a description of corpo­
rate relationships that includes both legitimate pursuit of self-inter­
est and necessary pursuit of the welfare of others . In this view, 
corporations straddle the black-letter line that separates the tradi­
tional doctrinal descriptions of fiduciary and contract relationships .  
The choice, a s  it  were, is to  be open-ended about descriptive 
choices .  No reductive vision of the corporation blocks considera­
tion of all the particulars of a matter under the code. 
It should be noted that the code follows the lead of the 
microeconomic description of the corporation in disregarding cor­
porate doctrine's categorical descriptions . But the resemblance is 
incidental . The code's drafters have not interposed a rational-ex­
pectations description of the corporation. Instead they implicitly as­
sume that a complex set of values figures into corporate behavior 
and that tensions will arise between self-interest and self-abnega­
tion. They leave these tensions for situational resolution based on 
more particular descriptions .  To facilitate these decisions ,  they in­
stall channels of communication between legal decisionmakers and 
regulated actors . 1 09 The code's underlying description thus does 
not imply deregulation. Indeed, in at least one instance, it could 
open a path to increased scrutiny. As we have seen, the code col­
lapses the shareholder-level fiduciary duty into the directors ' and 
107 .  See Marsh, supra note 82 (detailing the his tory of the duty of loyalty in the last 
century ) .  
I 0 8 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 1 . 
1 09. See infra text accompanying notes 1 1 9-20 . 
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officers ' duty, and thereby negates a long-standing doctrinal distinc­
tion that discouraged judicial intervention. I I o  
This invitation to stepped-up scrutiny, however, stands alone in 
the code. In the main, the drafters avoid asserting facts or shaping 
rules that point the law in the direction of significantly intensified 
fiduciary norms . The complex set of values in their description dis­
courages the isolation of categories of self-interested conduct for 
per se prescription . 1 1 1  The description thus distances the code from 
the antimanagerialist approach to fiduciary duty. I I 2 
3. Implicit Norms 
Although the code's drafters address and reject the 
microeconomic norm of free contract, 1 1 3 they make no sustained at­
tempt to address the antimanagerialist case against their self-regula­
tory model . We can, however, draw on the drafters ' comments 
about the purpose of their enterprise to construct such a rebuttal. 
This exercise begins the task of explaining and justifying the code's 
normative profile. 
The drafters emphasize that fairness is not an absolute, unchang­
ing concept,  but an evolving one. 1 1 4  A particular determination of 
"fairness" is a situational proposition; 1 1 5 internal corporate proce­
dures are aspects of the situation thus reviewed. Furthermore, the 
fairness norm does not evolve solely as a matter of the reaction of 
legal decisionmakers to business events . Business practice bears 
critically on the norm's articulation . 1 1 6 In the end, "fairness" gains 
substance as the result of a collaboration between legal decision 
makers and business people. 1 1 7  
1 1 0 .  The doctrine consigned shareholder-to-shareholder interrelations to a contrac­
tual world of self-interested pursuits .  See infra notes 1 66-6 1 and accompanying text. 
1 1 1 . This description instead supports the across-the-board inclusion of corporate 
decisionmaking into the legal process that we find in the code. See supra text accompany­
ing note 1 7 . 
1 1 2 .  The implicit description, while neither microeconomic nor antimanagerialist, 
does share significant assumptions with the relational model of contract law. The refer­
ence here is to the model of Macneil, see MACNEIL, supra note 80, rather than to the 
microeconomic version set out by Williamson and others. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAM­
SON, THE ECONOMIC I NSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CoN­
TRACTING ( 1 985) . Part I I I  of this Article applies the relational model to corporate 
fiduciary law. 
1 1 3 .  
·
They do this in connection with their discussion of opting out. See supra text 
accompanying note 68 . 
1 1 4 .  See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1 ,  Part V in troductory note a, at 263-64 . 
1 1 5 .  Cf id. § 5 .0 I cmt. c, at 27 1 -72  (stating that the "ful l  meaning" of fair dealing is 
context-dependent) . 
1 1 6.  Cf id. § 5 .02 (a) (2) (B) cmt. ,  at 292-300 (referring to business practice as a justifi­
cation for subjecting self-dealing transactions approved by disinterested directors to any 
scrutiny at all) . 
1 1 7 .  Thus the drafters defend their fairness s tandard by reference to a practice docu­
ment-the Corporate Director 's Guidebook, Subcommittee on Functions and Responsibilities 
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The code's provision for relaxed judicial scrutiny upon disinter­
ested board-level approval facilitates this process . 1 1 8 The provision 
induces corporations to take the law's fiduciary norms into account 
in the conduct of their business . It keeps business practice attuned 
to the norms of fiduciary law by vesting the directors with legal re­
sponsibility. At the same time, by providing for directorial input at  
the threshold level, i t  keeps fiduciary law attuned to the values of its 
constituents. 
The code, then, avoids imposing a behavioral blueprint on corpo­
rate actors , and instead offers them a process designed to elicit be­
havioral norms that take their values into account. Its drafters thus 
make a normative choice to privilege mediation over prohibition by 
rule. The implicit assumption is that corporate law's  normative 
agenda should be carefully delimited; it should attempt to deter­
mine neither the course of production nor the shape of production 
relationships .  
I t  bears noting that this endorsement, rationalization, and expan­
sion of the law's exis ting self-regulatory model of corporate conflict­
of-interest resolution is not a deregulatory program. The code in­
duces corporate actors to participate in a lawmaking system with 
carrots and sticks . If they do not participate, then the system sub­
jects their behavior to traditional constraints . If they do participate, 
then they must follow certain procedures if their internal decisions 
respecting conflicts of interest are to attain the force of law. Fur­
thermore, even where correct procedural forms are followed, the 
code leaves a substantive limit in the background, a limit rooted in 
the inherited body of law and built around the notion of the best 
interests of the entity. The code thereby declines to open a door to 
complete substantive self-determination by those in control of cor­
porations .  Its mandatory, albeit diluted, fairness s tandard leaves 
open the constant possibility that the final decision will not be left 
with corporate managers . 1 1 9  This possibility assures that input from 
legal professionals ,  and through them, society as a whole, will con­
tinue to influence the development of fiduciary law. 
of Directors, ABA, Corporate Director 's Guidebook, 32  Bus. LAw. 5 ( 1 976) . !d. § 5 .0 1 re­
porter's note 2 ,  at 273-74; see also id. § 5 .02(a) (2) (B)  cmt. , at 292-300 (referring to NEw 
YoRK STocK ExcHANGE, I N c . ,  NEw YoRK STocK ExcHANGE LISTED CoMPANY MANUAL 
( 1 990) and corporate codes of conduct) . 
1 1 8 .  Under the code's standard of review, literally applied, judicial lawmaking in this 
area operates on a factual and normative base supplied by the business people being 
regulated . The reviewing court must find the transaction to be "clearly outside the 
range of reasonableness ."  !d. § 5 .02(a) (2) (B)  cmt. ,  at 292-300. This gives the approv­
ing directors initial input on the boundaries of the "range of reasonableness ."  To the 
extent that the transaction must be "clearly" outside of that range in order to be held 
violative of the duty, the approving directors also are accorded a degree of discretion in 
fixing those boundaries. Finaily, the determination of fair and unfair transactions within 
the range is entirely left up to the directors. 
1 1 9 .  The code is a regime of "reflexive" law in that it "requires the legal system to 
view itself as a system-in-an-environment . . .  and to take account of the limits of its own 
capacity as it  attempts to regulate the functions and performances of other social subsys­
tems . "  Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements m Modem Law, 1 7  L,o,.w & 
Soc'y REv. 239, 255 ( 1 983) . But it is reflexive onlv to an extent ;  the final decision is not 
always the province of the regulated entity. 
· 
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The code thus uses the mandate of fairness to force corporate 
managers to mediate with other actors interested in the corporation 
and in society in respect of self-dealing transactions . 1 20 It succeeds 
no better than prior law in purveying the fairness mandate in an 
objective, self-executing form. But it does ameliorate the problem 
of vagueness by providing a framework for the mandate's future ap­
plication in which input from business people matters . 
The code, by encouraging mediation between the self-interest of 
the actors controlling the corporation and the interests of other cor­
porate actors, necessarily also mediates at a theoretical level . Its im­
plicit political theory of the firm is open-ended. Under the code, the 
state and its decision makers retain final power to determine the 
law's terms. But this confirmation of the sovereign's primacy in cor­
porate lawmaking does not imply that the corporation is a state in­
strument that exercises delegated state authority . 1 2 1  The code 
leaves too large a place for private participation for the image of the 
state instrumentality to make sense. At the same time, the code 
avoids treating the corporation as another species of private con­
tract. Its corporation is a private contract with public implications, 
suited to continued application of an inherited body of controls de­
rived through the legal system. 
C. Summary 
The Principles ' code, with the corporate law it restates,  takes the 
political middle ground . It avoids references to prevailing theories 
of corporate law that tend to privilege one aspect of the corpora­
tion's broader politics and economics at another's expense. And 
where it reshapes-as opposed to restates-the law, the code fo­
cuses on process over mandatory substance, whether regulatory or 
deregulatory .  It offers a system designed for the resolution of the 
future's difficul t  questions rather than a set of directions that resolve 
those difficult questions for us . 
1 20 .  The best substantiation of the Principles ' mediative approach is their most politi­
cally sensitive discussion-that on the purpose of the corporation. See Proposed Final 
Draft, supra note 1 ,  § 2 .0 1 (stating that the corporation 's purpose may focus on ethical 
and philanthropic considerations) ; id. § 2.0 1 cmt. h, at 80-82; 1d. § 2 .0 1 cmt. i ,  at 82-89 
(setting fonh ethical considerations and philanthropic purposes ) .  
1 2 1 .  On this concession theory, compare Robert Hessen, A New Concept of C01porations: 
A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1 327 ,  1 327-28 ( 1 979) (stating 
that the " importance of the corporate concession theory can hardly be overstated" ) ,  
with William W. Bratton, Jr . ,  The "Nexus of Contracts " Corporation: A Cntical Appraisal, 74  
CoRNELL L. REV. 407 ,  433-36 ( 1 989) (arguing that the concession theory has lost its 
vitality) . 
1 993] 1 1 1 1  
III. Restoring Confidence in Corporate Fiduciary Law-A 
Relational Perspective 
The foregoing discussion puts a positive gloss on the Principles ' 
fiduciary code. It explains the drafters ' choices in terms of a cooper­
ative vision of corporate regulation. But it does not foreclose the 
possibility of explaining some of these choices in other, less positive 
terms. The code's descriptive and normative flexibility s till plausi­
bly can be read from a negative, antimanagerialis t  perspective. 
Under this reading, the code creates opportunities to dilute fiduci­
ary constraints and thus manifests the wider decline of confidence in 
fiduciary regulation. Its empowerment of the disinterested director 
is nonproblematic only presupposing a judgment that unmitigated 
application of traditional doctrine leads to wrong answers and un­
justified costs . With that judgment comes the hope that business 
people, once invested with responsibility , will rise to the occasion 
and prove capable of statesmanship. Attractive though this aspira­
tion may be, it seems safe to predict that many business people will 
fail to live up to it. 
Indeed, weaknesses in the case for expanded self-regulation of 
conflict of interest transactions are apparent even without resort to 
an antimanagerialist point of view. Self-regulation tends to work 
well in institutional contexts where different actors with diverging 
interests play on a common regulated field in a situation of interde­
pendence and balanced power. Differing interests, when coupled 
with interdependence, give the actors incentives to monitor one an­
other and enforce legal norms . 1 22 Successful self-regulation also 
tends to require that independent, professionally motivated actors 
from inside the industry be designated to perform technical regula­
tory functions.  1 2 3  
Corporate boardrooms populated with outside directors appear 
at first glance to have these characteristics. Because the outside di­
rectors ' immediate financial interests lie with other firms, their per­
sonal reputational interests supposedly assure that the managers' 
self-interested proposals receive a skeptical and scrupulous recep­
tion; technical problems concerning value are referred to outside, 
supposedly neutral experts from the investment banking commu­
nity . The premise that a principle affiliation to a different firm as­
sures a director's independence is weak . As often has been noted, 
the high ranking executives of other firms who tend to be appointed 
as outside directors display a pattern of community of interest with 
1 22 .  See David P. McCaffrey & Sue R. Faerman, Shared Regulation in the United 
States Securities Industry 2 1 -23  (Feb. 1 993) (unpublished manuscript ,  on file with au­
thor) ;  cf Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 1 6  
L>.w & Soc. INQUIRY 435,  436- 445 ( 1 99 1 )  (suggesting that the problem of capture of 
regulatory agencies by regulated actors can be ameliorated by the empowerment of 
nongovernment organizations interested in effective regulation) . 
1 23 .  McCaffrey & Faerman, supra note 1 2 2 ,  at 23-25 (noting strong ties between se­
curities industry compliance officers and the SEC).  
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inside directors and officers . 1 24 They do not necessarily have inter­
ests sufficiently at variance with the mangers' interests to assure ef­
fective monitoring. Furthermore, the technicians drawn on in board 
room conflict of interest situations-investment bankers who render 
the valuation opinions on which boards base fairness determina­
tions-compete with one another for the business of providing this 
and other services . These actors have not been noted for their inde­
pendence of judgment. 1 25 
These doubts about the effectiveness of the code's self-regulatory 
scheme support the charge that it restates fiduciary law only to turn 
it over to corporate actors to be destroyed. 1 26 The code's  drafters 
make few efforts to anticipate or rebut the charge. 1 27 Indeed, they 
invite it. Consider their change of the duty's name to "fair dealing ."  
Despite their technical explanation, 1 28 the new contractual name 
rhetorically cuts the code off from its roots in traditional fiduciary 
concepts . It suggests a tie to the "no confidence" view of fiduciary 
regulation; both the lack of confidence and the idea that corporate 
law should be articulated in a contractual framework follow from a 
common set of assumptions. This contractual reference, taken to­
gether with the code's limit on review of disinterested-director deci­
sions,  suggests not self-regulation, but deregulation. 
The last part of this Article seeks to make a case for a more posi­
tive reading of the code-a reading that stresses the "regulatory" 
1 24 .  See Victor Brudney, The Independent Direction-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 
HARV . L. REv. 597, 609-6 1 2  ( 1 982) (describing the "institutionally generated disinclina­
tion to hold colleagues at arm's length) ;  James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the 
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implicatwns of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS.  83 , 99- 1 08 ( 1 985) (reviewing interpersonal familiarity and boardroom 
bias ) .  
The Principles ' defini tion of "significant relationship," which separates independent 
from inside directors, see Proposed Final Draft, supra note I ,  § 1 .34, does not distinguish 
directors who identify with management's point of view from those who identify with the 
point of view of investors. 
If  the institutional investor activism of recent years , see znfra notes 1 48-50 and accom­
panying text, becomes institutionalized, then the boardroom may become a more suita­
ble venue for self-regulation. Board members who identify themselves with investors' 
perspectives could prove to be vigorous monitors in conflict-of-interest situations .  
1 25 .  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fmmess Opzn ions: How Fair Are They and 
What Can Be Done About It �. 1 989 DUKE L .J .  27, 53 (stating that investment banks face 
conflicts of interest that lead them to use their discretion to render fairness opinions in 
management's favor) ; see also Ted ] .  Fiflis, Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 
70 WASH. U.  L.Q 497 ( 1 992) (recommending gatekeeper liability for negligent fairness 
opinions) . 
1 26. This debate will have a familiar sound to veterans of corporate governance dis­
cussions. The antimanagerialist realist emphasizes managerial cupidity and power pur­
suit .  The opposite side responds with an aspirational notion of managers as statesmen. 
See Gerald E.  Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.  REv. 1 276, 
1 297-98 ( 1 984) (critiquing both models of corporate analysis) . 
1 2 7 .  One can do little more than point to instances where the code intensifies the 
present or potential strength of the traditional fairness standard. See supra Part I .B .2 .  
1 28. See supra text accompanying note 1 2 . 
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aspect of "self-regulation . "  It makes two points toward this end. 
First, the substantive law that the code restates already possesses the 
responsiveness to the values of business actors that the code seeks 
to institutionalize through self-regulation. Mediation long has been 
intrinsic to the structure of corporate law. Second, the law's respon­
siveness, once highlighted, bolsters confidence in its normative mis­
sion. Traditional fiduciary concepts, properly understood, do not 
lead to wrong answers in contemporary corporate situations. We 
can address all the policy concerns that have prompted the recent 
academic movement away from fiduciary solutions and at the same 
time continue to make reference to traditional doctrinal notions . 
Corporate law can respond to economic imperatives even as it in­
corporates conventional notions of relational power and depen­
dence and aspirations of good will and self-sacrifice among 
fiduciaries. 
These points come forward when corporate law's recent evolution 
is viewed from a relational perspective. The relational model as­
sumes that actors make self-interested choices based on personal 
preferences and at the same time subscribe to norms that take some 
alternatives outside of the realm of free choice. Corporate law 
makes the same assumptions : its fairness mandate presupposes that 
self-serving corporate actors also subscribe to a norm of self-sacri­
fice. The norm's presence in the law implies an assertion that cor­
porate actors continue to subscribe to the norm. The assertion does 
not exclude the possibility that actors could abandon the norm in 
the future and move the bulk of conflict of interest determinations 
to the realm of preferential choice; but the burden lies on the party 
claiming that abandonment has occurred. 
The discussion that follows repeats the assertion that the norm 
operates, but with a caveat. In recent years, corporate institutions 
have evolved so as to expand the zone of preferential choice. A 
combination of factors-increased security holding through in­
termediaries , open trade in corporate control ,  and expanded oppor­
tunities for exit through securitization-significantly increases 
opportunities for treating corporate relationships as arm's-length 
exchanges . Because actors who turn to arm's-length bargaining 
tend to cease to rely on norms of self-sacrifice, the application of 
fiduciary norms must be adjusted. But, because none of these de­
velopments completely expunges norms of self-sacrifice from the 
corporate scene, they do not imply the elimination of fiduciary 
norms. Corporate production continues to require too much long­
term interdependence among the actors involved to be amenable to 
organizational structures that dispense with cooperative norms . In­
vestors still put themselves into a situation of dependence when 
they transfer capital to legal entities under the control of parties 
with different interests . Thus , aspirational standards of good will 
and self-sacrifice continue to influence the legal model of corporate 
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relationships, despite changing business practices . 1 29 
I t  follows that modifications of the traditional doctrinal fiduciary 
construct-such as those set out in the Principles ' fiduciary code­
neither follow from nor support the proposition that corporate fidu­
ciary law should be reconceived as an arm of contract law that back­
s tops the arm's-length exchanges of corporate actors . The rigid 
doctrinal concepts of earlier eras have disappeared from the law be­
cause of developments in the ordinary course of business practice, 
not because of some growing realization that a single contractual 
essential lies at the core of corporate production .  As this Part's dis­
cussion will show, contract law principles do bear a family resem­
blance to those applied in corporate contexts. Their meaning, 
however, is contextually bounded by contract law's relational frame­
work. Translated to corporate contexts, they have limited heuristic 
power. 
The Principles ' fiduciary code thus legitimately draws on the same 
aspirations that inform antecedent fiduciary law. The fiduciary con­
cepts it restates are a necessary and vital part of the legal model of 
corporate governance. Its self-regulatory structure should open 
channels of communication respecting the meaning of these princi­
ples, but need not and should not enervate them. Under this view, 
the contractual title chosen by the drafters carries no interpretive 
weight. Furthermore, disinterested-director participation should be 
treated as lawmaking rather than as contracting. The code, as i t  
were, invites the board to apply the law rather than to avoid i t .  
A. The Relational Properties of Cmporate Fiduciary Law 
Traditional doctrine holds that fiduciary duties differ in kind from 
contractual duties . 1 30 This proposition is responsible for a great 
deal of misunderstanding. Under the "no confidence" view, it  is 
thought to import a corporate fiduciary system that imposes trust 
concepts on agency situations with wealth-depressive results . But 
this much-discussed threat of inappropriate application of fiduciary 
principles is more apparent than real .  We can dispel it by drawing 
on a relational theory of private law to modify the distinction be­
tween fiduciary and contract. 
1 29 .  Cf Bernard S .  Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 
Nw. U.  L.  REv. 542, 573-74 ( 1 990) (arguing that cul ture and extralegal norms of proper 
behavior play an important part in managerial self restraint ) .  
1 30 .  See supra text accompanying notes 78-8 1 .  
1 993] 1 1 15  
-� . . ,, 
�-_ ... · 
I. Corporate Doctrine Without an Essential Fiduciary Duty 
Under relationalism, all private interactions fall  into the same ca­
pacious legal category. 1 3 1  Legal duties fol low from the context and 
incidents of the particular relationship . A notion of the "fiduciary" 
survives as a characterization applicable in certain intertwined situa­
tions in the wider world of voluntary relationships .  A contrasting 
notion of "discrete contract" also survives. The discrete contract 
lies at one end of the relational continuum; intertwined, enduring 
relationships ,  including many trust relationships,  lie at the other. 
Different relationships can be identified as having different "dis­
crete" or "relational" elements and different "contractual" or "fidu­
ciary" elements ; many relationships combine both elements of both 
pa1rs . 
Relational inspection thus breaks the doctrinal categories . But it 
does not thereby undercut legal fiduciary duties. Mandatory impo­
sition easily can be reconfirmed from a relational perspective . The 
sovereign plays a role in every relationship . I t  enforces the discrete 
contract, but otherwise is little involved with it. With relationships 
of empowerment and dependence, government intervention is more 
likely to become a part of the relationship ' s  fabric . At some point, 
sufficient responsibility is reposed in one party to prompt not only 
legal duty, but nonwaivability of that duty . 1 32 At the same time, 
some situations deemed "essentially" fiduciary under the doctrine 
come up for relational scrutiny because of their contractual aspects .  
Questions are particularly pertinent in respect to relationships, such 
as corporate relationships,  midway along the continuum . The re­
moval of the differentiating essence makes the actors and their prac­
tices more prominent as normative determinants of legal duties . In 
the relational picture, the duties follow from the parties '  values 
rather than from the sovereign . In this framework of relational con­
tingency, corporate fiduciary law becomes more cognizant of corpo­
rate practice and the values of corporate actors . Changes in the 
practice thus should affect the law. For example, if shareholder ex­
pectations change from long-term to short-term, and from reliant to 
self-protective, then the intensity of the fiduciary duties that protect 
them should change correspondingly. 1 33 
Even absent changes in practice, the relational perspective raises 
questions about the status of legal duties once universally assumed 
to be mandatory. If the "essential" fiduciary element is removed, it 
1 3 1 .  There are two variants of relational contract theory, open and closed. The open 
variant admits social and political values in addition to economic values .  The closed 
variant is limited by the frameworks of microeconomics. Macneil is the primary " open" 
writer. See, e.g. , MACNEIL, supra note 80, at 78-84 . On corporate topics, see also Alison 
G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. 
REv. 738,  776-78 ( 1 978 ) .  Williamson is the primary closed writer. See WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 1 1 2 ,  at 298-302; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E .  Scott ,  Principles of Rela­
tional Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv.  1 089, 1 095- 1 1 1 1  ( 1 98 1 ) .  The "relationalism" referred to 
in the text of this Article is the open variant. 
1 32 .  See Anderson, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 759-6 1 .  
1 33 .  See infra notes 1 38-50 and accompanying text for a description of recent 
changes. 
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becomes plausible to recharacterize corporate relationships in con­
tractual terms . Moreover, if the relational description includes an 
effective waiver of legal protection by the beneficiary, the transfor­
mation to contract status becomes complete. A knowing waiver re­
vokes the trust on which the fiduciary characterization res ts. The 
waiver shows that the parties themselves treat the relationship con­
tractually . Arguably, respect for the parties' choice counsels that 
the legal characterization follow suit .  Under this analysis ,  nothing in 
corporate relationships can be "essentially" fiduciary as long as 
practical possibilities for waiver present themselves . It stands to 
reason that the recent debate over the mandatory aspect of corpo­
rate fiduciary law devolved on all sides to a technical discussion 
about standards for effective consent . 1 34 
But making the fiduciary aspect of corporate law contingent 
rather than essential does not imply that a foundational "corporate 
contract" lies beneath the surface ready to substitute for the old fi­
duciary model of the corporation. The fact that, analytically, the fi­
duciary can yield to contrary agreement does not prove that 
contrary agreements have been or could be entered into. In public 
corporations, for example, no one seems to "know" as an empirical 
proposition what degree of legal protection the parties really "pre­
fer. "  The parties might not even know themselves-thus leaving 
their ultimate preferences open to suggestion. I t  follows that ques­
tions about the effectiveness of consent to alternative contractual 
arrangements need to be asked on an ongoing basis .  Answers will 
tend to depend on the model of consenting actor applied by the 
commentator. The more disabled the actor becomes at self-protec­
tion, whether because of cognitive failings or erratic behavior pat­
terns, the more appropriate mandatory fiduciary duties will prove to 
be. 
2. Business Practice and Corporate Fiduciary Law Under a Relational 
Approach 
Signals from actors in practice bear critically on the law's norma­
tive substance under a relational approach, just as they do under a 
microeconomic model of the corporation. But the two approaches 
construct the corporate actor differently and thus hypothesize differ­
ent sets of signals .  The microeconomic model assumes complete 
self-interest while the relational model does not. The two models 
therefore must treat the corporation differently to the extent that, in 
practice, actors in corporate relationships treat one another with 
good will and practice the self-abnegation described in the doctrinal 
1 34 .  See, e.g. ,  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 32-34; Gordon, supra note 88,  
at 1 575-77 .  
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picture of the fiduciary relation�hip . Under a rel.ational. view, if 
good will underlies the relationship ,  then a legal regtme bmlt on the 
self-interest model improperly disregards constitutive values . Such 
a constitutive business ethic, once imposed in law, i s  not imposed 
solely as sovereign dictate. I t  is self-imposed, albeit indirectly, by 
corporate actors . 1 35 
Under a relational approach, the traditional fiduciary ethic could 
be eliminated from corporate law. But doing so would require an 
empirical model of the corporation working along the lines de­
scribed by Jensen and Meckling in their famous article; 1 36 actors on 
all sides would have to engage in relationships conceived and exe­
cuted as discrete contracts . In such a corporation, fiduciary duties 
could not be imposed under either a relational or microeconomic 
perspective. With arm's-length relationships and no external inju­
ries,  the state that mandated fiduciary norms would fail to respect 
the actors ' autonomy and values in favor of recognizing values from 
some other source. Moreover, because the price terms of these dis­
crete contracts would allocate the risk of opportunism, ex post judi­
cial intervention might precipitate an uncompensated wealth 
transfer to an opportunistic claimant. In contrast, where good will 
suffuses the relationship, intervention to constrain opportunism rec­
ognizes the relational roles of the actors . As with any legitimate 
contract enforcement, the ex post constraint on the actors' freedom 
has a legitimating antecedent in their own conduct. 
The Jensen and Meckling model does not describe fairly today's 
public corporation. Even so,  some corporate relationships ,  particu­
larly those between investors and management, have taken on a 
more discrete aspect in recent history .  These changes in business 
practice help explain the success of the rational-expectations ap­
proach in academic writing. 1 37  They also help explain the emer­
gence of the disinterested director in a mediating role in the 
Principles . 
During the postwar period, investors have become better able to 
protect themselves. Today, they tend to hold diversified portfolios 
of liquid securities traded through professional intermediaries .  
During the first part of this century, when commentators first fo­
cused on the unprotected small investor, they did not. At that time, 
a handful of investment bankers dominated the capi tal markets. 
1 35 .  For an example of judicial responsiveness to the values of business actors, com­
pare the opinions of Judges Clark and Friendly in Essex Universal Corp. v .  Yates , 305 
F.2d 572  (2d Cir. 1 962) . The question was whether the sale of a 28 .3% block of stock 
might amount to a breach of fiduciary duty under the sale of control doctrine. !d. at 573 ;  
see supra note 60.  Friendly, worried about the fiduciary problems of  the sale but  lacking 
support in state law, advocated that the federal court say nothing at  all. !d. at 58 1 -82 .  
Clark would have remanded for development of a record: " [P]articularly in view of our 
lack of knowledge of corporate realities and the current standards of business morality, I 
should prefer to avoid too precise instructions to the district court . . . .  " !d. at 579 .  
1 36. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 87 ,  at 343-57 .  
1 37 .  For a fuller exposition of this point, see William W.  Bratton, Jr. , The New Eco­
nomic Theory of the Finn: Critical Perspectives from History, 4 1  STAN . L. REv. 1 47 1 ,  1 5 1 7-26 
( 1 989) .  
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Moreover, few individuals invested through intermediaries. 1 38 By 
the time the contractual conception of the firm appeared in econom­
ics in the 1 970s, the capital markets, supported by Depression-era 
legal reforms, had been transformed. They offered a more reliable 
place for trading. This change has encouraged the technical process 
of "securitization," through which additional classes of investments 
have become exchangeable and liquid. 1 39 Competitive financial in­
termediaries holding well-diversified portfolios also have ap­
peared. 1 40 These institutions practice the economists' self­
protective theories and make this practice available to small inves­
tors . They have begun to replace unprotected small individuals as 
the conventional "investor ." 1 4 1  As a result, the old policies of inves­
tor protection have lost much of their hold on legal discourse .  
These changes have made the discrete contract an  appropriate ba­
sis for understanding and evaluating corporate security holding re­
lationships. In effect, the fiduciary principle suffered a loss of 
support in business practice. Self-protective capacity, anonymity, 
and speedy entrance and exit have made the traditional fiduciary in­
dicia of power and dependence less apparent in the corporate at­
mosphere. The rational-expectations justification of fiduciary law 
carries this practical adjustment to the level of theory. 
But these changes do not by any means deliver us into the dis­
crete world hypothesized by Jensen and Meckling. The corporation 
is too complex an institution. It requires a multi-sided descrip­
tion . 1 42 At one level, sophisticated investors with diversified portfo­
lios enter into discrete short-term participations . At the same time,  
in any particular corporation, the shareholders as a whole make a 
permanent capital investment. They lack the benefit of an institu­
tional structure that puts them in a position of bargaining reciproc­
ity and must rely on someone else to manage the capital . Even 
assuming widespread institutional holding, cognizable shareholder 
1 38 .  Richard Whitely, The Transformation of Business Finance into Financial Economics: The 
Roles of Academic Expansion and Changes in U. S. Capital Markets, 1 1  AccT . ORGANI ZATIONS & 
Soc'v 1 7 1 ,  1 8 1  ( 1 986) . 
1 39 .  See generally jAMES C. VAN HoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND Poucv 527-29 
(9th ed. 1 992) .  
1 40 .  See Robert A.  Taggart, Jr . ,  The Growth of the "Junk " Bond Market and Its Role in  
Financing Takeovers, in  MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 5,  7 (Alan ]. Auerbach ed. ,  1 988) .  
1 4 1 .  Contemporary scholarship focuses on ways to harness increasingly concentrated 
institutional shareholdings to effect governance results .  See, e.g. , George W. Dent ,  Jr . ,  
Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1 989 Wis.  L. REv. 88 1 ,  907-
1 5  (recommending proxy solicitation by 10 or 20 largest holders) .  Direct legal interven­
tion to protect the unsophisticated, small shareholders does not hgure into contempo­
rary governance discussions as a policy imperative. Cf Gordon, supra note 88, at 1 557  
(arguing that no special protection of uninformed investors is necessary in connection 
with charter terms of companies doing initial public offerings) .  
1 42 .  Traditional corporate doctrine does manage a multi-sided, if  still imperfect, pic­
ture of the corporation. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83. 
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dependence and management power remain. Moreover, the group 
of shareholders can diversify risks of mismanagement only to an ex­
tent. Ultimately, investors s tand on one side in our institutional 
framework and managers on the other. One side s til l  may injure the 
other, despite diversification . In short, a basis remains to sustain 
the old picture of separated ownership and control . 1 43 The ratifica­
tion of the legi timacy of mandatory fiduciary duty by academic writ­
ers and the drafters of the Principles 1 44 confirms this point. 
The positive picture remains unsettled. Investors and managers 
continue to make relational adjustments , as shown by some recent 
developments in business practice. First, the momentum of corpo­
rate restructuring fell off drastically when credit tightened. 145 This 
decline has disempowered market actors relative to managers and 
caused discrete contracts between market actors to play a lesser role 
in corporate power allocation. 1 46 The microeconomic story of mar­
ket constraints on management discretion has lost force 
correspondingly. 147  
Second, institutional investors , particularly public pension 
funds , 148 have become assertive in corporate governance matters . 149 
This development suggests that institutional holdings have become 
143 .  See supra note 84 . According to the latest economic studies, the capital asset 
pricing model's explanatory capacity is smaller than formerly supposed. See Eugene F. 
Fama & Kenneth R .  French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427 ,  429-
40 ( 1 992 ) .  Possibilities for shareholder injury increase accordingly. 
1 44 .  See supra text accompanying notes 5 - l  0. 
145 .  The number of LBO restructurings peaked at 1 25 in 1 988;  the dollar amount of 
those res tructurings peaked in the last quarter of 1 988.  The market collapsed in the 
fourth quarter of 1 989. In the first half of 1 990, only 1 1  new LBOs were announced. See 
Arthur Fleischer, Jr . ,  lvlergers and Acquisitions in the 1 990 's, in 2 22No ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
SECURITIES REGULATION, at 1 3 1 ,  1 34 (PLI Corporate Practice Course Handbook Series 
No. 7 1 3 , 1 990) . 
1 46 .  For a contradictory theory of the rise of the market for corporate control and the 
empowerment of market actors, see Bratton, supra note 1 37 ,  at 1 5 1 7-26 .  
1 4  7 .  Even Eas terbrook and Fischel, the principal proponents of the market-constraint 
story of corporate governance, have reconsidered the scope of the operative market .  See 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 1 68-70, 2 1 8  (noting that the "proliferation of 
s tate antitakeover statutes" calls into question whether s tate competition for corporate 
charters is beneficial ) .  
1 48 .  The California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS")  has been the 
most active. See, e.g. , Pension Fund Petition Could Prompt Br9ad Changes in SEC 's Proxy System, 
5 Corp. Couns . Wkly. (BNA) , No.  9, at 8 ,  (Feb. 2 1 ,  1 990) (reporting CalPERS' petition 
for changes in the SEC proxy rules to facilita te communication and action among share­
holders ) ;  Eric N .  Berg, Sears is Urged to Set Up Advisory Panel of Big Holders, N .Y.  TIMES,  
Dec. 4 ,  1 990,  a t  D3 (reporting CalPERS'  proposal of a nine-member shareholder advi­
sory committee to advise floundering managers) .  But private funds also have taken a 
more aggressive posture. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 99, at 867-68 n. l 2  (noting 
that Fidelitv Investments has removed investment limitations on its mutual funds to al­
low them t� purchase more than 1 0 %  of a company's s tock, join in a proxy fight, or seek 
the sale cf a company) .  
1 49 .  Their efforts have taken three directions. First, they have used their votes and 
voices actively to discourage defenses against the operation of the market for corporate 
control and to encourage more aggressive use of the shareholder franchise. Second, 
and more important, they have publicly criticized certain managers and have urged the 
creation of shareholder advisory committees .  Finally, they occasionally have sought to 
influence the selection of their portfolio companies' outside directors. Gilson & Kraak­
man, supra note 99, at 892-95. For a survey of recent activities , see John Pound, Beyond 
Takeovers: Politics Comes to Cmporate Con trol, 70 HARV. Bus.  REv . , Mar.-Apr. 1 992 ,  at 83 .  
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large enough to limit the force of the old "Wall Street Rule ." Given 
sufficiently large holdings , diversification and portfolio adjustment 
may not be the final steps in the process of maximizing return on 
investment. Expenditures of time and money in corporate govern­
ance processes may produce greater returns than selling and mov­
ing on to the securities of yet another suboptimally managed 
firm. J 5o 
Suppose that collective action by institutional holders becomes an 
everyday part of corporate life.  The power s tructures of public cor­
porations would look somewhat different as a result. Under the still 
meaningful separation of ownership and control, management 
stands on one side of a power divide and market actors stand on the 
other. They have little means of power allocation inter se other 
than the drastic move of a hostile tender offer. Ins titutions in the 
habit of talking to each other might end up forming coalitions and 
go on to sustained interaction with management. 1 5 1 Power would 
flow to them as a result. Legal duties might change accordingly. 
The legal picture of complete shareholder dependence becomes 
less appropriate, the classic shareholder collective action problem 
having been surmounted to some extent. Possibilities for opting 
out would open up . 1 52 This would not necessarily cause the dis­
placement of traditional fiduciary ideology from the law, however; 
arm's-length "market" treatment of these relationships would not 
be appropriate either. Indeed, given the continued existence of a 
dependent subclass of shareholders , the fidelity of the newly em­
powered institutions becomes a legal concern . The projected pic­
ture less resembles the cold contracting world of the microeconomic 
model than the colorful world of the close corporation. As with 
close corporations, special balances of self-interest and responsibil­
i ty would develop under the fiduciary rubric .  
B. Relational Flexibility Without a Contractual Essence 
The notion that traditional fiduciary concepts invite wrong an­
swers to corporate questions implies a need to reconceive the doc­
trine's conceptual underpinnings. This search for additional 
1 50. For a cost-benefit analysis, see Black, supra note 99,  at 570-585; see also Special 
Report, Economic Reasoning Chang�ng Direction of SEC Deliberations, Gnmdfest States, 22 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 206, 209 (Feb. 9, 1 990) . 
1 5 1 .  For a discussion of the implications of coalition building in the context of corpo­
rate control transfers, see Coffee, supra note 46, at 1 53 1 - 49.  
1 52 .  On the other hand,  it  might take considerable structural posi tive-law reform to 
bring this  picture into reality. Professor Dent proposes a fundamental res tructuring that 
puts the proxy machinery in shareholder hands .  He suggests that the law should give a 
committee of the I 0 or 20 largest shareholders exclusive access to the corporate treas­
ury to pay for proxy solicitations. See George W. Dent ,  Jr . ,  Toward Unifying Ownership and 
Control in the Public Corporation, 1 989 WIS .  L. REv. 88 1 ,  907 .  
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normative flexibility leads to contract law's less intense fairness 
norm. As with the title of the Principles ' code, "loyalty" is replaced 
with "fair dealing." But, going beyond the title, the change is made 
thoroughgoing. 
Unfortunately, this search for a right answer invites a different 
sort of wrong answer. Responsiveness to business practice will not 
find its way into the law's  fabric if an essential corporate contract is 
constructed to replace a discarded notion of essential fiduciary duty. 
All the contractual theories of the corporation articulated in recent 
years pose this problem. 1 53 Furthermore, the problem of wrong an­
swers has been overstated.  It lies mostly in the law reviews them­
selves. Commentators tend to respond to one another at the same 
time that they respond to the cases . As we have seen, traditional 
fiduciary principles overlap in part with the assertions of an­
timanagerialist academics . 1 54 But the two are distinct at  bottom be­
cause fiduciary doctrine never follows from a single ,  well-defined 
theory of corporate governance. Academic corporate-governance 
discourse tends to lose sight of this point, mistakenly assuming that 
antimanagerialist assertions and doctrinal fiduciary concepts follow 
from a single point of view. The conflation, not the case law, creates 
the threat of fiduciary overkill . 
The solution to the problem is de novo examination of corporate 
fiduciary doctrine without an antecedent paradigmatic program of 
one or another sort. Like contract law, corporate fiduciary law turns 
out to be sensitive to the facts of particular relationships .  But, be­
cause the two bodies of law have evolved in the service of different 
relationships,  their structural frameworks are not interchangeable. 
1 .  A Good-Faith Norm 
Consider, as a means to the end of evaluating corporate doc­
trine's relational flexibility, Professor Coffee's suggestion that we 
look to contract law's " good faith" norm in articulating the scope of 
fiduciary duties . Coffee's treatment is the most relationally sensitive 
of the recent discussions of corporate law's contractual aspects. He 
avoids the constraints of microeconomic notions of contract and 
looks both to actors in practice and to positive law for relational 
substance. His approach even has a mediative aspect. He draws on 
the open-ended "omitted term" concept of contract doctrine and 
accords gap-filling judges the power to style themselves as police 
against ex post opportunism . 1 55 But Coffee also proposes a norma­
tive essence: "good faith . "  He offers this as a minimum standard 
1 53 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 26-28 .  
1 54 .  Antimanagerialists can be as critical of fiduciary doctrine as can Chicago School 
economists .  For general criticism,  see, for example, William L. Cary, Federalism and Cor­
porate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J .  663 , 673-74, 67 7-683 ( 1 974) (criticizing 
the Delaware courts ' application of the duty of loyalty) ,  and Chirelstein, supra note 85, at 
205-07 (recommending abolition of common law fiduciary duty and fairness s tandards 
respecting managers in favor of legislated rules or standards of a more specific 
character) . 
1 55 .  Coffee, supra note 90. at 1 623,  1 653-64 . 
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for mandatory corporate law. 1 56 
Coffee's good faith norm is plausible. The "good faith" actor 
avoids self-interes ted action that is unnecessary to the realization of 
his or her own contract expectations and that impairs the expecta­
tions of the other party . 1 57 This good faith concept has a healthy 
flexibility when inserted into corporate law. It avoids overplaying 
norms of management selflessness. At the same time, it recognizes 
the value and necessity of self-abnegation. To some extent,  there­
fore, it respects the traditional dynamic of corporate fiduciary doc­
trine .  Indeed, good faith often is the norm actually applied in many 
corporate cases decided under the "fiduciary" appellation. 1 58 
Unfortunately, the fit is s till far from perfect. Contract law and 
corporate law, viewed relationally, overlap at significant points with­
out being coextensive. "Good faith," when applied to corporate 
contexts ,  entails normative realignment. Values get lost in the 
process .  
Contract law responds to a range of situations, from the simple 
sale of goods for money to long-term, open-ended situations of sup­
ply or co-ownership . Contract cases range between discrete and re­
lational transactions , and between arm's-length and interdependent 
postures on the actors' parts . The reactions of decision makers 
dealing with relationships falling along these ranges tend to be 
colored by their respective individualistic or altruistic disposi­
tions . 1 59 As a result, norms of selflessness have a volatile pattern of 
application. In practice, the "good faith" mandate is not taken as a 
directive to recognize limitations on self-interested value maximiza­
tion .  It merely invites consideration of the possibility. In many situ­
ations, the presumption remains against the party requesting that 
self-interest be constrained, 1 60 even though the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts lays down good faith as an absolute value attaching to all 
1 56. !d. at 1 674 (combining good faith with the contract notion of unconscionability ) .  
1 57 .  Deborah A.  DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: A n  Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1 988 
DUKE Lj.  879,  900 . 
1 58 .  See, e.g. , Speed v. Transamerica Corp . ,  235 F .2d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 1 956) (dis­
cussing a failure to disclose facts in connection with exercise of call right of convertible 
security) ; Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. , 422 N .W.2d 798 (Mass. App. 1 98 1 )  (discuss­
ing the self-interested use of a close-corporation veto power) . 
Coffee notes, probably correctly, that rendering fiduciary duties in good faith terms 
would cause little change in the terms of traditional self-dealing cases. Coffee, s upra 
note 90, at 1 665. 
1 59 .  See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REv. i 685 , 1 7 1 3 , 1 723-24 ( 1 976) (arguing that legal doctrines fashioned by 
legislators and judges are affected by altruism and individualism) . 
1 60 .  Cases dealing with corporate bond contracts make a good example. Bondhold­
ers who have lost value as the result of issuer opportunism repeatedly make "good 
faith" claims, only to be told by the judge that theirs is an arm's-length contract that 
permits self-interested value appropriation short of fraud.  See, e.g. , Metropolitan Life 
Ins .  Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. ,  7 1 6  F. Supp. 1 504,  1 5 1 6-23 (S .D.N.Y. 1 990) . 
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contracts . 1 6 1 
Corporate law responds to a wider range on the relational contin­
uum. Certain corporate situations track contract patterns very 
closely. For example, with corporate shareholder-to-shareholder 
duties , we find zones of self-interest and zones in which good faith 
tempers self-interest. Like contract law, corporate law here medi­
ates conflicts between the accompanying norms . 1 62 But other cor­
porate situations do not follow contract patterns .  These involve 
heightened interdependence absent from the subject matter of basic 
contract law. Here, in the zone of the duty of loyalty, corporate law 
subordinates self-interest in a mode not replicated in contract law. 
2. Comparing the Patterns 
The corporate duty of loyalty imposes a burden of justification 
respecting self-interested activities. As we have seen, the actors sub­
ject to the duty, by employing the appropriate procedures, can shift 
the burden to the objecting shareholder. Under existing law, how­
ever, the shift in the burden does not preclude a shareholder show­
ing of substantive unfairness . 1 63 This fairness determination does, 
of course, require mediation between self-interest and self-sacrifice. 
Viewed in this way, the corporate duty looks like the contract good­
faith duty, which calls for the same mediation. 
The similarities, however, are not thoroughgoing. The corporate­
law mediation proceeds on a mandatory foundation; the director or 
officer cannot avoid the possibility of substantive scrutiny . The con­
tract good-faith mediation proceeds in a different context. Contract 
enforces transactions in the first instance on a formal showing of 
consent and consideration. Self-interest is assumed and accepted 
without scrutiny; the doctrine specifies that legal decision makers 
should not inquire into the equivalency of the values exchanged. 1 64 
Of course, this equivalency inquiry nevertheless can arise under 
modifying doctrines such as good faith and unconscionability, but 
only on a special showing that takes the case out of the normal re­
gime of sanctioned self-interest . 1 65 Thus, contract law, and the core 
of corporate fiduciary law, employ dis tinct presumptions respecting 
the appropriateness of self-interested behavior. The good faith 
norm, despite similar verbiage, is contextually bound. I t  asks mate­
rially less of corporate actors than does the fiduciary fairness norm. 
Corporate shareholder-to-shareholder duties, in contrast, support 
direct comparison with contract law. Corporate doctrine remits 
shareholders to a contractual world. Absent fraud, it  approves self-
1 6 1 .  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 ( 1 979) .  
1 62 .  See infra notes 1 66-7 5 and accompanying text. 
1 63 .  See supra note 3 1  and accompanying text. 
1 64 .  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 79; id. § 79 cmt. c ( 1 979) . Viewed 
from an economic perspective, this provision of contract doctrine has the same roots as 
the contractarian challenge to judicial scrutiny of corporate transactions for fairness .  
The assumption is  that the parties are better equipped to determine price than the 
judge. See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 7 1  (2d ed. 1 977 ) .  
1 65 .  See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § §  4 . 1 ,  4 .9  ( 2d  ed .  1 990) . 
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interest with respect to votes and sales of shares . 1 66 Here, tradition­
ally, the law gave us the opposite of fiduciary overkill-the close cor­
poration freezeout in which bad faith majority shareholders capture 
the returns on minority shareholders ' investments. 1 67 Of course, 
shareholder-to-shareholder law never quite replicated the tradi­
tional normative climate of sales of fungible goods; unlike widgets , 
shareholder votes cannot be sold . Mandated cooperation asserts it­
self to make vote selling a breach of duty . 1 6s 
As we have seen, corporate law has developed doctrines that re­
strain self-interested conduct at the shareholder level . 1 69 Twenti­
eth-century contract law has developed the doctrines of good faith 
and unconscionability to perform analogous tasks . Many parallels 
can be drawn between the two restraining doctrines. 
The corporate case law has a mediative aspect. 1 70 The cases effect 
situational accommodations of self-interest and cooperation.  In so 
166. HARRY G.  HENN & JoHN R.  ALEXANDER, LAws OF CoRPORATIONS 654-56, 723-24 
(3d ed. 1 983) . 
167 .  For a description of this phenomenon, see CLARK, supra note 82,  § §  1 2 . 1 ,  1 2 .4 .  
For a recent summary of the evolution of legal norms respecting private ordering in 
close corporation contexts, see Thompson, supra note 9 1 ,  at 392- 403. 
1 68 .  See Chew v .  Inverness Management Corp . .  352 A.2d 426, 430 (Del .  Ch.  1 976) ;  
Macht v .  Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co. ,  1 94 A. 1 9, 22 (Del .  Ch. 1 937 ) . 
1 69 .  See supra text accompanying notes 44- 46. 
1 70. Both the case law and the mediative aspect have long historical roots . The lead­
ing late nineteenth-century case is Meeker v .  Winthrop Iron Co .. 1 7  F .  48 ( 1 883 ) .  
There, a corporation that failed to  secure a favorable mining lease purchased a majority 
of the s tock of the potential lessor, took control ,  and effected adoption of the previously 
unsuccessful  lease proposal. The minority stockholders brought a successful action. 
The court took the majority control situation as an occasion for inquiring into the ade­
quacy of the consideration on the lease. !d. at 49-5 1 .  Said the court: 
The ownership of a majority of the capital stock of a corporation invests the 
holders thereof with many valuable incidental rights . . . .  But, in thus assum­
ing control, they also take upon themselves the correlative duty of diligence 
and good faith. They cannot lawfully manipulate the company's business in 
their own interests to the inj ury of other corporators. 
!d. at 50. Citing this case and a standard of "utmost good faith" based on majority con­
trol power, Victor Morawetz set out a majori ty-to-minority fairness duty in his 1 886 trea­
tise. See VICTOR MoRAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS § 4 77 .  
at 45 1 - 452 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Company, 2d ed. 1 886) . Significantly, Morawetz 
and his contemporaries set out an additional contractual basis of responsibility. The 
majority could not depart from the terms of the charter, see id. , and had to maintain the 
corporation's original objects of formation. 
The majority-to-minority duty thus entered the doctrine in an awkward posture. 
Stockholders did not owe fiduciary duties to each other, SEYMOU R  D.  THOMPSON, CoM­
MENTARIES ON THE LAw OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS § 860 I, at 7207 (San Francisco, Ban­
croft-Whi tney Company 1 894) ,  but majori ty stockholders could in some cases owe 
duties that resembled fiduciary duties to minorities. /d. The phrase "quasi trust rela­
tion" appears. CHARLES F. BEACH,  JR . ,  CoMMENTARIES oN THE Lnv OF PRIVATE CoRPO­
RATIONS § 70, at 140- 4 1  (Chicago, T.H . Flood & Co. 1 89 1 ) ;  see also WILLIAM W. CooK, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS § 662, at 697-698 (New York, 
Baher, Voorhis & Co. 1 887) . For later restatements of the doctrine, see HARRY W.  BAL­
LANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 278 (rev. ed. 1946) ; WILLIAM L. CLARK & WIL­
LIAM L. MARSH:\LL, A TREATISE ON THE Lc�.w OF PR IVATE CoRPORATIONS § §  626-627 ,  at 
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doing they take on an experimental quality. Consider three leading 
Massachusetts cases that constrain the classic freezeout under the 
fiduciary rubric. 1 7 1  The first opinion lurches in the direction of a 
strict rule of equality . 1 72 The second pares back the rule to a stan­
dard balancing of equality and business purpose . 1 73 This purport­
edly "fiduciary" rule, applied to an intracorporate deadlock 
situation in the third case, becomes a reasonableness review of 
the tactical excesses of arm's-length players . 1 74 At this point, the 
court's analysis of fiduciary duty becomes indistinguishable from 
"good faith" scrutiny of performance patterns under long-term 
contracts . 1 75 
The same tentativeness and adaptability appear in cases employ­
ing the majority-to-minority shareholders ' duty to protect holders of 
publicly traded securities . Courts have imposed strong fiduciary 
bars , only to retrench in later cases involving exercises of call 
rights , 1 76 sales of control blocks at premium prices ,  1 77 and takeout 
mergers . 1 78 In these cases, as in the Massachusetts dose-corpora­
tion cases, the courts initially recognize that the free play of self­
interest under the traditional doctrine presents an ethical problem. 
They respond with familiar fiduciary constraints . 1 79 Over time ,  it 
turns out that norms of welfare and reciprocity counsel a more 
even-handed mediation. As the doctrine evolves , it approximates 
the contractual good-faith restraint . I so 
1 904-05 ( 1 90 1 ) ;  CHARLES B. ELLI OTT, A TREATISE oN THE LAw oF PRIVATE CoRPORA­
TIONs § §  4 3 2 , 433, 474 (Stewart Chaplin ed., 5 th rev. ed. 1 92 3 ) ; JoHN T. MuLLIGAN, LAw 
OF CoRPORATIONS § 74, at 235-237 ( 1 9 1 3 ) . 
Today, of course, we call the majority-to-minority duty "fiduciary . "  Even so,  the 
"quasi-fiduciary" appellation of a century ago would not be inappropriate. 
1 7 1 .  In chronological order, these are Donahue v .  Rodd Electrotype C o . ,  328 N . E . 2 d  
5 0 5  (Mass.  1 97 5 } ,  Wilkes v .  Springside Nursing Home, I n c . ,  3 5 3  N .E . 2 d  657 (Mass .  
1 97 7 } ,  and Smith v .  Atlantic Properties, Inc. ,  4 2 2  N . E . 2 d  798 (Mass.  App . C t .  1 98 1  ) .  For 
a very different reading of these cases , see Mitchell ,  supra note 86,  a t  1 699- 1 7 1 4 (criticiz­
ing the succession of progressive departure from the fiduciary principle) . 
1 7 2 .  Donahue, 328 N . E . 2 d  at 5 1 5- 1 7 .  
1 73 .  Wilkes, 353 N .E.2d a t  663 . 
1 74 .  Smith, 422 N . E . 2 d  at 80 1 -0 3 .  
1 75 .  See, e.g., Bloor v .  Falstaff Brewing Corp . ,  60 1 F . 2 d  609, 6 1 4  (2d Cir. 1 979) ; Parev 
Products Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 1 24 F.2d 1 4 7 ,  1 4 9  (2d Cir.  1 94 1 ) .  
1 76 .  Compare Zahn v .  Transamerica Corp. ,  1 62 F.2d 3 6  ( 1 94 7 )  with Speed v .  Trans­
america Corp . ,  235 F . 2 d  369 (3d Cir. 1 956) (damages phase of same case ) .  
1 77 .  Compare Perlman v .  Feldman, 2 1 9  F.2d 1 73 ,  1 75-76 (2d Cir. )  (holding a maj ority 
stockholder to a standard of strict fiduciary duty during a controlling interest sale), cert. 
denied, 349 U . S .  952 ( 1 955)  and Jones v .  H . F .  Ahmanson & C o . ,  460 P.2d 464, 4 7 1  (Cal.  
1 969) (same) with Zetlin v .  Hanson Holdings, Inc . ,  397 N . E . 2 d  387, 388 (N.Y. 1 979)  
(applying the less  strict good faith fiduciary duty to a sale o f  stock by a majority 
shareholder) . 
1 78 .  Compare Singer v. Magnavox Co. ,  380 A.2d 969 (Del .  1 97 7) (holding that maj or­
ity shareholders owe the minority a fiduciary duty) with Weinberger v .  UOP, Inc . ,  4 5 7  
A.2d 70 1 ,  7 0 3  (Del. 1 983) (holding that the minority shareholder must demonstrate 
unfairness to win a suit challenging a cash-out merger) . 
1 79 .  See supra notes 1 7 1 -7 5  and accompanying text. 
1 80 .  Ironically, in the cases involving publicly traded securities,  the modified fiduci­
ary duty doctrine provided firm ground for the restructurings o f  the late 1 980s . Deci­
sionmakers in effect refrained from imposing cooperative norms so that a great 
experiment in wealth maximization through arm's-length contract could go forward 
without a significant burden of litigation from those injured in the process .  
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The free play of self-interest at the shareholder level can be con­
strained by contract as well as by judicial decree. With mutual 
promises regarding voting and management, close-corporation 
shareholders contain the dangers of self-interested conduct by im­
posing rules of cooperation on themselves .  Here the mediation of 
self-interest and cooperation follows a crooked path to a s table bal­
ance. Shareholders "opt out" of the juridical corporate s tructure in 
order to "opt in" to a self-imposed system of mutual responsibility .  
Shareholders resort to  contract to  achieve mutual responsibility be­
cause they mistrust one another. Contractual devices are required 
in the close-corporation context because the law, even with share­
holder-level fiduciary protections well-established, offers insufficient 
ex ante protection of the shareholders ' trust. But, just as traditional 
corporate shareholder-to-shareholder law had to be modified to al­
low for fiduciary protections,  it  also had to be modified to allow for 
contract devices. Shareholders' agreements tend to traverse the 
structural norm of management by the board of directors . This 
norm, which pursues an ideal of group action and responsibility, 
had to be modified so that the same goal could be achieved through 
arm's-length negotiation. 1 8 1 But the conflict arose less between 
"corporate" and "contractual" principles than between clumsy and 
adroit integrations of self-interest and cooperation. Here, contract 
succeeds better. 
Reconsider Professor Coffee's good faith proposition in the light 
of this survey . I t  assumes that corporate law should have a single 
positive and normative center of gravity. This assumption is widely 
shared. We can read the history of corporate legal theory during 
the past decade or so as a tripartite struggle among backers of three 
competing centers of gravity . Antimanagerialists advocated a strong 
fiduciary norm, economic writers promoted self-interest, and insti­
tutional contractarians-such as Coffee-backed good faith. 1 82 This 
discourse meets a positive objection: relationships in and around a 
single corporation do not have a single normative center of gravity; 
they entail many norms. The actors mediate internally between 
these norms, and the law serves as a backstop by providing addi­
tional mediation and a few mandates. The actors and lawmakers 
both draw on good faith and traditional fiduciary standards of fair­
ness, and at the same time sanction the self-interested infliction of 
injury on others . 
1 8 1 .  See Coffee, supra note 90, at 1 642- 45 .  
1 82. M o s t  in the latter group treat good faith a s  a rational maximizing tool.  See Brat­
ton, supra note 77 ,  at 70-7 1 (noting that scholarship critical of the neoclassical "nexus of 
contracts" theory of the firm tends to proceed in a rational expectations framework and 
conclude with a finding of contract failure) . Coffee's discussion is notable for the influ­
ence of the conventional conception . Coffee, supra note 90. 
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In particular situations, normative reasons may be suggested for 
reshaping the law to allocate more weight to one or another of the 
norms .  But a global presumption in favor of one norm or another 
seems unj ustified. Here the inherited body of corporate legal doc­
trine shows greater refinement than contemporary corporate legal 
theory. The doctrine holds to the fiduciary norm at the board level, 
but not absolutely. At the shareholder level, it admits good faith 
with much the same situational skepticism that we find in contract 
doctrine. Self-interest, tempered by the insider trading rules, 
prevails on the securities markets . 1 83 
Corporate law, then, applies the same values in corporate con­
texts that contract law applies in contract contexts . No basis results 
for realignment of corporate doctrine to a template drawn from ba­
sic contract law, even under the values that inform contract law. 
The two deal with different relationships .  
C. Summary 
This Part's relational defense of the inherited body of corporate 
fiduciary law has significant points in common with the Principles ' 
code, at least as explicated in the previous Part 's  discussion of its 
drafters ' implicit choices . Both aspire to leave the law ' s  foundations 
open and admit the possibility that developments in business prac­
tice will change legal norms . Both also avoid the narrowing effects 
of politically driven paradigms.  Oddly, though, recognition of these 
points of consonance between the two implies a point of dissonance. 
If fiduciary law is as flexible and sensitive to the values of actors in 
practice as this Part suggests, then it is not clear why the code 
needed to take steps to strengthen its self-regulatory aspect. The 
code's recognition of the judgments of disinterested directors does 
add an explicit guaranty of a full  hearing for corporate purposes and 
business exigencies. But it does so at the cost of a risk of impair­
ment of the integrity of vital norms.  The cost-benefit determination 
remams open. 
Conclusion 
I t  is difficult to fault the Principles for recognizing that a complex 
set of values must be synchronized in the regulation of self-dealing 
transactions and recommending that corporate fiduciary law should 
privilege mediation over prohibition by rule. Nor can the code be 
faulted for recognizing that business people have a role in the crea­
tion of fiduciary law and for encouraging their participation in the 
lawmaking process .  The problem arises when the code articulates 
the business actors ' participatory role .  By conceding a measure of 
adjudicatory authority to business people while holding out the pos­
sibility of later judicial reversal under an open standard , the code 
1 83 .  Adjustments of norms in the doctrine have been accomplished with finesse. Ef­
fective legal mediation lies as much in the recognition and correction of a misstep as in 
getting i t  absolutely right the first time. 
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brings business actors into the lawmaking process but leaves the 
precise definition of their role for later solution. That solution's  
contours will depend on the relative credibility of board room deter­
minations as adjudications and on the vitality of the code's limiting 
fairness norm. 
The time for according weight to the board room determination 
has not arrived and could be long in coming. Despite the presence 
of the Principles ' independent directors , board room processes still 
do not assure that fiduciary determinations will include adequate 
consideration of the investor's point of view. This lack of process 
integrity is material , because the fiduciary norm remains vital . I t  is 
one thing to say that the norm's legitimate articulation requires the 
input of business people. It is quite another to say that a board 
called upon to approve a colleague's self-interested transaction 
should be the primary source for such input. We can rely on other 
channels .  Fiduciary law stays sensitive to the values of business peo­
ple as the structural proposition. Our corporate law system pro­
vides endless opportunities for management participation in policy 
formulation. Given jurisdictional competition and the leadership 
role of the management-responsive state of Delaware, business pref­
erences are assured of serious consideration. 
The Principles ' provision for self-regulation of conflict of interest 
transactions therefore should be seen as a structure for limited, 
present implementation but possible future expansion. For now, 
the business actors whom the code brings into the legal process 
should be reviewed strictly. Their tasks are to develop a record of 
fact and to apply law formulated elsewhere. Courts should not hesi­
tate to overrule their normative judgments .  
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